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INTRODUCTION

Among the most notable accomplishments in America's ongoing
evolution is a definitional one: the transformation of the nation's denizens,
initially disposed to identify with their states, into "Americans." This
development, of course, was not the result of mere chance or inadvertence:
the nation's Constitution itself was born of a recognized need to bind
residents more tightly than permitted by the Articles of Confederation,' as
evidenced in the Preamble's invocation of "We the People of the United
States."2 Almost a century later, in the wake of a regionally inspired Civil
War,3 the need to fortify the nation's collective identity was again made
manifest, inspiring a constitutional amendment expressly making Americans4
citizens both of the "States wherein they reside" and "of the United States."
As a result, national citizenship came to serve as "the dominant and
paramount allegiance among us" to a greater extent than ever before.5
Throughout the nation's history one premise has thus held firm: "that
the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together." 6 First
1.
See 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 449 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) (letter of James Madison toJ.G. Jackson) ("[Miost of us carried into the Convention a
profound impression produced by the experienced inadequacy of the old Confederation. .. as
to the necessity of binding the States together by a strong Constitution."); id. at 455 (General
Remarks on the Convention by James Madison) (expressing hope that the Constitution would
exercise a "restraining influence . . . on the aberrations of the States .... stifl[ing] wishes &
inclinations which would otherwise ripen into overt & pernicious acts"). Hamilton condemned
the "unneighborly regulations of some States," which were "contrary to the true spirit of the
Union," and posited that, if left unchecked, state conflicts would cause citizens of each state "to
be considered and treated by the others in no better light than that of foreigners and aliens."
THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 151 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., Johns Hopkins
Paperbacks 1981) (2d ed. 1966).
2.
3.
(1988).

U.S. CONST. pmbl.
See generally JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA

4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside."); see also ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 106 (1998) (observing
that in the wake of the Civil War there emerged a "newly empowered national state and the idea
of a national citizenship enjoying equality before the law").
5.
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 182 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 510 (1939) ("The first sentence of the
[Fourteenth] Amendment settled the old controversy as to citizenship .... Thenceforward
citizenship of the United States became primary and citizenship of a State secondary.");
MELINDA LAWSON, PATRIOT FIRES: FORGING A NEW AMERICAN NATIONALISM IN THE CIVIL WAR
NORTH 3 (2002) (noting that in the wake of the Civil War "a 'Union' of states had become a
'nation' of Americans"); MCPHERSON, supra note 3, at 859 (observing that before the Civil War
"the United States" was often a plural noun and that in its aftermath it was regarded as
singular).
6.
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935) (Cardozo,J.); see also Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969) ("'For all the great purposes for which the Federal
government was formed, we are one people, with one common country.'" (quoting Smith v.

EX-OFFENDERRESIDENCE EXCLUSION LAWS

jeopardized by primarily commercial conflict (late 1700s) and later political
conflict (mid-1800s), national solidarity today faces a new threat, one of a
social nature: state efforts to ban ex-criminal offenders, in particular those
convicted of sex offenses, from their bounds.
At this time, eighteen states and hundreds of localities have adopted
laws preventing convicted sex offenders from living in prescribed areas, 7
affecting thousands of individuals.' Given the enormous political appeal of
exclusion laws, 9 and the reluctance of the judiciary thus far to invalidate
them, 0 there is every reason to expect that they will continue to proliferate,
and if past experience holds, inspire efforts to target other ex-offender
subpopulations as well. This expansion, however, will come at the expense of
the nation's collectivist tradition, for while the individuals targeted by the
laws are despised and feared, they ineluctably also constitute part of the
"people []" with whom all Americans must "swim.""
This Essay addresses how such subnational efforts at social control
undermine American constitutional collectivism. Part II provides an
overview of the current wave of residence exclusion laws, examining the
broad range of constraints the laws impose on individuals. The discussion
then situates the laws in the context of other governmental strategies to use
geographic limits to achieve social control goals, an impulse the Supreme
Court once deemed "founded . . . in the sacred law of self-defense." 2

Residence exclusion laws, however, differ from these kindred efforts in
important ways, most importantly because the laws can effectively result in

Turner (The Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492 (1849))); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S.
(6 Wall.) 35, 43 (1867) ("The people of these United States constitute one nation. They have a
government in which all of them are deeply interested.").
7. See infra notes 26-48 and accompanying text.
8. See
Parents
for
Megan's
Law:
Nationwide
Registries
&
Links,
http://www.parentsformeganslaw.com/htmI/links.lasso (last visited Aug. 31, 2006) (providing
state-by-state count of registered individuals).
9. See, e.g.,
Charles Toutant, Zoning Out Sex Offenders, N.J. L.J., Nov. 21, 2005, at Al
(observing that residence exclusion laws "are usually passed with little debate and zero
opposition, since sex offenders are the pariahs of modern society").
10. See infra notes 70-113 and accompanying text. On November 28, 2005, the Supreme
Court refused to reconsider the most significant decision to date on the issue, Doe v. Miller,
which upheld the constitutionality of Iowa's residence exclusion law. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700
(8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 757, 757-58 (2005).
11.
Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 523; see also NAT'L DIST. ATT'YS ASsoC., POLICY POSITIONS ON
PRISONER REENTRY ISSUES,
stint.
1, at 1
(2005),
available at http://www.ndaa-

apri.org/pdf/policy-position-prisonerreentry.-july-17-05.pdf (acknowledging that "prisoner
reentry has become a crucial criminal justice issue"). The literature emphasizing the
importance of successful reentry and the constellation of challenges it presents is expansive and
growing by the day. For notable examples, see generally JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS
COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY (2003); JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK:
FACING THE CHALLENGES OF PRISONER REENTRY (2005).

12.

R.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 471 (1877).
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indefinite status-based banishment from entire states, backed by threatened
criminal sanctions.
Part III examines the state and federal judicial decisions that have thus
far addressed residence exclusion laws. Showing characteristic deference to
the police power of states, in each instance courts have rebuffed challenges.
Missing from these decisions, which focused on the residence restrictions of
the particular provisions challenged, however, is critical concern for the
actual in-state and out-of-state consequences of exclusion laws. While the
laws do not impose de jure banishment, 3 they do, in conjunction with
already acutely limited housing options for ex-offenders, impose limits that
result in de facto banishment. Individual state efforts to expel and repel exoffenders, in turn, ultimately have broader systemic effects; other states,
fearful of an invasion of ex-offenders, respond by adopting their own
exclusion laws, domino-effect style. As a consequence, as the laws gain favor,
a classic tragedy of the commons problem is now taking shape, with states
exporting negative externalities in the form of increased social welfare costs
associated with offender reentry, and, ultimately, the prospect for criminal
recidivism.
Part IV discusses how residence exclusion laws defy the collectivist
traditions on which the nation was founded and threaten the destructive
interstate discord the federal union was designed to avoid. After canvassing
the many textual manifestations of constitutional collectivism, the Essay
focuses on its prime jurisprudential manifestations, singling out two of the
Supreme Court's Dormant Commerce Clause decisions in particular. The
first, Edwards v. California,14 addressed a state effort to exclude the poor, a
subclass of the nation's citizenry that, like ex-offenders, has historically been
regarded with disdain. The second, City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 5
addressed a state effort to bar solid and liquid waste from its territory, an
impulse that again parallels modern American
correctional policy, aptly
6
referred to as a system of "waste management."
In both instances, the Court, while acknowledging the exigencies
motivating state isolationism, invalidated the laws because they betrayed the
collective imperative of dealing with challenges (the poor and waste) faced
by all states. By analogy, the states cannot be permitted to eschew the social
and economic challenges presented by ex-offenders, who today reenter

13. Interstate banishment itself has traditionally resisted successful federal constitutional
challenge. See Stephanie Smith, Comment, Civil Banishment of Gang Members: Circumventing
Criminal Due Process Requirements?, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 1461, 1480-81 (2000). Courts have,
however, invalidated banishment laws on public policy grounds. See infra note 148 and
accompanying text.
14. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
15. City of Phila. v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
16. See Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging
Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 470 (1992).
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society in unprecedented numbers. In sum,just as the nation recognized the
need to quell state isolationism vis-A.-vis economic and commercial matters,
so too must it recognize the need to limit state efforts to isolate themselves
from the collective social responsibility of ex-offender reentry.
Part IV examines the prospects for a means to stem the proliferation of
exclusion laws. Ideally, the states themselves, in the face of the obvious nowin, comity-based problems associated with exclusion, would resist the
temptation to enact the laws. However, the potent political appeal of
exclusion weighs heavily against this likelihood. Courts provide another
possible avenue; however, the absence of a specific constitutional basis for
intervention makes judicial relief equally improbable. Finally, given that the
laws present a collective action problem generated by self-interested states,
federal congressional intervention has significant appeal. However, federal
political leaders, who themselves must stand for reelection before state
voters, likely will be disinclined to contravene the politically popular impulse
to exclude, resulting in the continued enactment and application of the laws
by states.
II.

FEAR AND LOATHING (IN ONE'S OWN BACKYARD)

In addition to being the world's sole political superpower, modern
America enjoys preeminent distinction as a punisher. In recent years, the
nation has been engaged in an unprecedented experiment in mass
penality,17 regularly leading the world in imprisonment rates.18 America's
penchant for the death penalty, likewise, remains an enduring basis of
distinction among Western countries.' 9 As recognized by Michael Tonry,
"[W]e live in a repressive era when punishment policies that would be
unthinkable in other times and places are not only commonplace but also

17.

At year-end 2004, nearly seven million individuals were incarcerated or on probation

or parole in the United States, amounting to more than 3% of the population. LAUREN E.
GLAZE & SERI PALLA, U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2004, at 1 (2005). In 2004, the national inmate population grew by 2.6%, to
roughly 2.2 million. PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLENJ. BECK, U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
PRISONERS IN 2004, at 1-2 (2005). For data on the rapid growth of the U.S. prison population
over the past quarter century, see THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,

PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974-2001, at 1 (2003) (projecting that
if rates remain constant, 6.6% of persons born in the United States in 2001 will go to prison
during their lives, up from 1.9% in 1974).
18.

ROY WALMSLEY, BRITISH HOME OFFICE, WORLD PRISON POPULATION 1 (5th ed. 2003)

(noting that the United States leads the world in per capita imprisonment rates, followed by

Russia and Belarus). For discussion of America's comparative punitive position vis-A-vis Western
Europe, see generally JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003).
19.
See Wayne A. Logan, Casting New Light on an Old Subject: Death Penalty Abolitionismfor a
New Millennium, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1336, 1337 (2002) (reviewing AUSTIN SARAT, WHEN THE
STATE KILLS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN CONDITION (2001)).
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are enthusiastically supported
by public officials, policy intellectuals, and
"2 °
much of the general public.
Foremost among the targets for the nation's punitive zeal have been sex
offenders. 2' Beset by a "moral panic" in the 1990s, 2 states significantly

increased prison terms for convicted sex offenders23 and took renewed
interest in long-dormant provisions permitting their involuntary
commitment upon release from prison.24 These measures, while achieving
the desired goal of physical confinement, failed to assuage public concerns
over ex-offenders subject to community release. To address this gap, states in
the mid-1990s (at the urging of the federal government) enacted sex
offender registration and community notification laws, now in effect
nationwide. 5
With the dawn of the new millennium, however, another communitybased strategy has gained popularity-laws prohibiting convicted sex
offenders from living in specified locations. Eighteen states now prohibit
such individuals from living near schools and other places where children
potentially congregate.26 The spatial limits range from 500 feet 27 to 2,000

20.

Michael Tonry, Rethinking Unthinkable Punishment Policies in America, 46 UCLA L. REV.

1751, 1752 (1999).
21.

See ADAM SAMPSON, ACTS OF ABUSE: SEX OFFENDERS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

124 (1994) ("The vehemence of the hatred for sex offenders is unmatched by attitudes to any
other offenders.").
22.

PHILLIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD MOLESTER IN

MODERN AMERICA 6 (1998); see alsoJonathan Simon, Managing the Monstrous: Sex Offenders and
the New Penology, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 452, 455-56 (1998) (discussing the powerful
political allure of "popular punitiveness" and its impact on sex offender-related legislation).
23. See Nora V. Demleitner, First Peoples, First Principles: The Sentencing Commission's
Obligation to Reject False Images of Criminal Offenders, 87 IOWA L. REV. 563, 571-74 (2002)
(surveying national increases in sex offender penalties). For instance, as a result of this
emphasis, during the period 1980-1995 the number of sex offenders in Minnesota state prisons
increased 230%. See Community Notification, SESS. WKLY., vol. 12, No. 13, at 7 (Minn. H.R. 1995).
During this time, one out of every five Minnesota prisoners was incarcerated for a sex offense.
Id.
24. See Eric S. Janus & Wayne A. Logan, Substantive Due Process and the Involuntary
Confinement of Sexually Violent Predators,35 CONN. L. REV. 319, 323-25 (2003).
25. See Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification: EmergingLegal
and Research Issues, in 989 ANNALS OF THE NEWYORK ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, SEXUALLY COERCIVE
BEHAVIOR: UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGEMENT 337-38 (Robert A. Prentky et al. eds., 2003).
26. ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(a) (1995 & Supp. 2005); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(a) (2006);
FLA. STAT. § 794.065 (2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-13(b) (Supp. 2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 188329 (2004 & Supp. 2006); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/11-9.3(b-5) (2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-

42-4-11(c) (West Supp. 2006); IOWA CODE § 692A.2A(2) (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.495
(West 2003 & Supp. 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91(A)(2) (2004 & Supp. 2006); MICH.
COMP. LAWS §§ 28.734(1), 28.735(1) (2004 & Supp. 2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-25(4)
(2000 & Supp. 2006); Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.147 (2000 & Supp. 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14208.16 (Supp. 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.031(A) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 57, § 590 (2001 & Supp. 2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-24B-23 (2004 & Supp. 2006);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-211 (a) (2003 & Supp. 2005).
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feet,28 with most states setting the ban at 1,000 feet.29 All laws use schools and
parks as geographic anchor points, but some sweep more broadly.
Louisiana, for example, also specifies "any playground, public or private
youth center, public swimming pool or free standing video arcade facility,"3 °
while Georgia's newly adopted law also prohibits residency within 1,000 feet
of any church or "area where minors congregate" 31 -defined to include,
inter alia, school bus stops, parks, neighborhood centers, playgrounds,
gymnasiums, and swimming pools. s 2 In addition, many states augment
33

loiter
residence restrictions with limits on where targeted individuals can
34
or prohibit them from working within the designated zone. Finally, most
states treat violations of the laws as felonies,35 with Georgia punishing
36
violations with prison terms between ten and thirty years.
In addition, several states impose residency limits on registrants subject to release
pursuant to probation and parole conditions. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003(g) (West 2005);
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 144.642(1)(a), 144.643 (2004); WASH. REV. CODE § 72.09.340(3) (a) (2003).
While the discussion here focuses mainly on individuals required to register who are otherwise
legally free to move about, limits placed on probationers and parolees are also at issue because
such individuals can and often do leave states subject to the Interstate Compact for the
Supervision of Adult Offenders. See Michael L. Buenger & Richard L. Masters, The Interstate
Compact on Adult Offender Supervision: Using Old Tools to Solve New Problems, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U.
L. REV. 71, 73 (2003) (discussing the Act, codified at 4 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2000), and noting that
it is in effect in forty-eight states and the District of Columbia).
27.
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8329 (Supp. 2006); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(b-5) (2004);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-24B-22(1) (Supp. 2006).
28.
ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(a) (Supp. 2005); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(a) (2006); IOWA
CODE § 692A.2A(2) (2005); OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, § 590 (Supp. 2005).
FLA. STAT. § 794.065(1) (2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(a) (Supp. 2006); IND. CODE §
29.
35-42-4-11(c) (Supp. 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1(A)(2) (2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
28.733(f) (Supp. 2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 566.147(1) (Supp. 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.16
(Supp. 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.031 (A) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005); TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 40-39-211 (a) (Supp. 2005). Mississippi's recently enacted law adopts a middle position: 1,500
feet. MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-25(4) (2000 & Supp. 2006).
30. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14: 91.1(a) (2) (2004).
31.
GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(a) (Supp. 2006).
32.
Id. § 42-1-12(a) (3). As of this writing, Georgia's school bus stop provision in particular
is being challenged in federal court. Although the lawsuit is in its early stages, the district court
judge has certified the class and enjoined the law's enforcement. See Whitaker v. Perdue, No.
06-0140 (N.D. Ga. July 28, 2006) (separate orders certifying class and enjoining enforcement).
33. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(b) (2004). While eschewing an outright
residency, restriction, in 2006 the Washington Legislature banned "convicted child sex
offenders" from the premises of schools, playgrounds, parks, and swimming pools. Under the
provision, personnel at such premises are authorized to serve written notice on targeted
individuals directing them to leave, with felony prosecution threatened if they do not comply.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44 (2005 & Supp. 2006).
34. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(a) (Supp. 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(b) (1) (Supp.
2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-211 (a) (Supp. 2005); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 28.734(1),

28.735(1) (Supp. 2006) (precluding employment and loitering).
35.
See ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(h) (Supp. 2005); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(d) (2006); GA.
CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(d) (Supp. 2006); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(d) (2004); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-42411 (c) (West Supp. 2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-33(2) (2000); MO. REV. STAT.
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The laws cast a broad net, tying eligibility to state registration criteria,
which can be expansive, sweeping up serious and nonserious and sexual and
nonsexual offenders alike,"7 with eligibility trigger dates often dating back
many years. 38 Only five states limit their laws to persons convicted of sexual
offenses involving child victims, the subpopulation the laws ostensibly seek
to protect.3 9 Two other states draw classification distinctions among classes
of registrants: Louisiana targets only "sexually violent predators" 40 and
Arkansas singles out the most serious offender subpopulations under the
state's tiered risk classification scheme. 41 Presumably mindful that forcing
individuals from their homes would present constitutional takings and due
process problems, 42 most (but not all) states prescribe that exclusion is to
apply to newcomers. 43

§ 566.147(3) (Supp. 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.16(f) (Supp. 2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, §
590 (Supp. 2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-211 (e) (Supp. 2005). Five states punish violations
as misdemeanors. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8329 (Supp. 2006); IOWA CODE § 692A.2A(3)
(2005); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.495 (West Supp. 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1(e)
(2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 28.734(1), 28.735(1) (Supp. 2006). In Florida, punishment
depends on the seriousness classification of the prior criminal misconduct that triggers
application of the law. See FLA. STAT. § 794.065(1) (2004). Ohio, alone, sanctions violations of
its law civilly, permitting suits for injunctive relief against registrants. See Coston v. Petro, 398 F.
Supp. 2d 878, 885 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (citing and discussing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2950.031,
2950.02(B) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005)). Of late, however, some Ohioans have voiced frustration
over what they see as the slow and onerous process entailed and the lack of a criminal penalty
for violators. See generally Robin Erb, Ohio's Sex-Offender Law Tough to Enforce: Toledo Law Director
Pushes Ordinanceto Protect School Zones, BLADE (Toledo, Ohio),July 17, 2006.
36. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(d) (Supp. 2006).
37. See Wayne A. Logan, HorizontalFederalism in an Age of CiminalJusticeInterconnectedness,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 257, 281-83 (2005) (discussing the broad range of predicate offenses that
can trigger registration under state laws); see also Brian Dickerson, Overhaul Sex Registry or Cause
More Damage, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 20, 2006, at 1 ("Michigan lawmakers cast their nets
wide, subjecting thousands of low-risk, non-violent offenders to mandatory registration."); Leigh
Woosley, Modern-Day Scarlet Letter, TULSA WORLD, Apr. 17, 2005, at DI (discussing exclusion of
ex-prostitute convicted of indecent exposure, based on exposing her breast to an undercover
officer).
38. Logan, supranote 37, at 298 n.208.
39.
See FLA. STAT. § 794.065 (2004); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/11-9.3(b-5) (2004); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-11(c) (West Supp. 2006); IOWA CODE § 692A.2A(1) (2005); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 40-39-211(a) (Supp. 2005). Alabama's 2,000 foot general residence exclusion zone does
not single out specific ex-offenders, but its subprovision prohibiting loitering within 500 feet of
a broader range of locales is limited to persons convicted of sexual offenses involving minors.
ALA. CODE §

15-20-26(f) (Supp. 2005).

40. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1(A)(2) (Supp. 2006). The category includes such
offenses as "crimes against nature" and "video voyeurism." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:541(14.1)
(2004).
41. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(a) (2006).
42.
See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 11.12,
13.5 (7th ed. 2004).
43. Residence exclusion laws in Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Ohio
apply to all targeted individuals. In the other twelve states, laws exempt individuals who owned
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In addition to states, local governments have shown significant interest
in residence exclusion provisions. Localities in states without such laws have
quickly and enthusiastically approved ordinances, 44 politically popular
efforts custom-made to draw the attention of state legislators. 45 Likewise,
localities in jurisdictions adjacent to states with exclusion laws, fearful of an
influx of sex offenders, have seized the initiative and enacted their own
laws. 46 Finally, in states with exclusion laws, local governments have often
imposed more onerous restrictions, which, while possibly vulnerable to

or leased their residences before the effective date of the law or lived there before the school or
other designated entity moved into the exclusion zone.
44. See, e.g., James W. Prado Roberts, Home of Megan's Law Still Has Gaps in Sex Offender
Notification, GANNETr NEWS SERV., Mar. 7, 2006, at BI (noting that at least 108 New Jersey
municipalities have enacted residence exclusion ordinances); Steve Wartenberg, Quakertown
Bars Child Molesters: Council OKs Law Giving Convicted Offenders No Place to Stay, MORNING CALL
(Allentown, Pa.), May 4, 2006, at BI (noting unanimous approval by Quakertown, Pennsylvania
City Council of ordinance barring ex-offender residences within 2,500 feet of "any school, childcare facility, park or playground"). Moreover, in states without residence exclusion laws, the
private sector has shown interest in exclusion, with developers enjoying increased sales by
imposing sex offender exclusion provisions. See Wendy Koch, Developments Bar Sex Offenders, USA
TODAY, June 16, 2006, at 3A (quoting developer of homes in Texas and Kansas to the effect that
exclusion has "probably increased our sales three to four times .... fight[s] sex offenders head
on"). To date, such common-interest residential community provisions have survived legal
attack. See Mulligan v. Panther Valley Prop. Owners Ass'n, 766 A.2d 1186, 1192-94 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2001) (rejecting challenge brought by homeowner, who was not a sex offender, in
part due to insufficient information on the extent of such covenants in the state housing
market). For additional discussion of private homeowner efforts in this regard, see generally
Brett Jackson Coppage, Balancing Community Interests and Offenders Rights: The Validity of
Covenants RestrictingSex Offenders from Residing in a Neighborhood, 38 URB. LAW. 309 (2006).
45. See, e.g., Maria Cramer, FitchburgJoins Effort to Restrict Sex Offenders; Proposal Would Limit
Where They Could Live, BOSTON GLOBE, June 22, 2006, at BI (noting that local officials in
Fitchburg, Massachusetts, "hope enough towns pass their own rules to pressure the Legislature
into enacting a statewide law"); James A. Quirk, Sex Offender Ban Eyed by Town, ASBURY PARK
PRESS (N.J.), Aug. 14, 2005, at BI ("'It's a little like a pebble rolling down the road .... If we
start making enough noise in Manalapan, Trenton will have to start listening to us.'" (quoting
Miracle Torregrossa)). Under the Manalapan ordinance, individuals are barred from living
"within 2,500 feet of any school, day care center, day camp, library, park, playground,
recreational facility or convenience store." James A. Quirk, Manalapan Approves Sex-Offender
Ordinance,ASBURY PARK PRESS (NJ.), Aug. 26, 2005, at B8.
46.
See, e.g., John Ferak, Ashland Puts Limits on Sex Offenders, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Nov.
19, 2005, at 8B (Nebraska border towns); Emily Klein, Galena to Sex Offenders: Stay Out; City
Council Approves Ordinance That Restricts Child Sex Offenders, TELEGRAPH HERALD (Dubuque,
Iowa), Jan. 24, 2006, at A3 (Illinois border towns). Nebraska's newly enacted law, which does
not create a statewide exclusion zone, expressly authorizes individual cities to establish limits,
setting the maximum distance at 500 feet. Karen Sloan, Cities Will Be Altering Limits on Offenders:
Omaha Is OK, but Some Will Have to Change Ordinance Passed Before a State Law Set Specific
Parameters,OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Apr. 27, 2006, at IA.
47. In Orange Beach, Alabama, for instance, elected officials adopted an ordinance that
broadens the Alabama 2,000 foot exclusion to four miles. Ryan Dezember, City Tightens Sex
Abuser Restrictions, MOBILE REG., Sept. 8, 2005, at B3. Officials in Snellville, Georgia,
unanimously approved an ordinance that more than doubled (to 2,500 feet) the parameter of
the state's exclusion law. John Ghirardini, Snellville: No Room in the City for Sex Offenders; Council
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preemption challenge, 48 will impose pressure on state politicians to ratchet

up extant state laws.
To students of social control, the current wave of residence exclusion
laws is neither new nor novel. The laws share an obvious common
motivation with other types of Not in My Backyard ("NIMBY') legislation,
which seek to deflect activities with adverse community impacts (especially
environmental) to other jurisdictions.4 9 They also parallel historically
accepted efforts to exclude socially undesirable individuals, condoned at the
nation's origin in the Articles of Confederation. 5 Sixty years later, the
Supreme Court itself backed New York's efforts to exclude paupers arriving
by ship, recognizing it "as necessary for a state to provide precautionary
measures against the moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and possibly
convicts as it is to guard against the physical pestilence, which may arise
from unsound and infectious Articles." 51 Over the ensuing
decades,
53
5
poor.
the
and
'
vagrants
exclude
to
fit
saw
often
governments

Toughens Living Restrictions,ATLANTAJ.-CONST., May 21, 2006, at IJ. In Florida, more than sixty
local governments have enacted ordinances doubling the state's 1,000 foot exclusion
parameter. Todd Leskanic, More Cities Limit Residences of Sex Offenders, TAMPA TRIB., May 14,
2006, at Metro 1. Likewise, Florida local officials have shown interest in extending the law to all
registrants, not just those convicted of crimes involving minors. Rebecca Dellagloria, Law
RestrictingSex Offenders Passes,MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 28, 2005, at ML.
48. For discussion of the question of preemption of local criminal provisions in the face of
less stringent state laws addressing the same governmental concern, see Wayne A. Logan, The
Shadow Criminal Law of Municipal Governance, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1409, 1421 (2001). For a recent
instance of a rejected preemption challenge concerning a local sex offender registration and
community notification law that was stricter than its state law counterpart, see ACLU of N.M. v.
City ofAlbuquerque, 137 P.3d 1215 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006).
49. See generally BARRY G. RABE, BEYOND NIMBY: HAZARDOUS WASTE SITING IN CANADA AND
THE UNITED STATES (1994) (discussing the siting of hazardous waste facilities); Barak D.
Richman & Christopher Boerner, A Transaction Cost Economizing Approach to Regulation:
Understandingthe NIMBY Problem and Improving Regulatory Responses, 23 YALEJ. ON REG. 29, 37-50
(2006) (discussing various responses and approaches to NIMBY).
50. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV (exempting "paupers, vagabonds, and
fugitives" from being eligible to exercise the right of state ingress and egress and from enjoying
the privileges and immunities available to others).
51. New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 142 (1837), overruled in part by Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160,177 (1941).
52. See Papchristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 161 (1972) (recounting history of
antivagrancy laws and invalidating local law on due process grounds); Harry Simon, Towns
Without Pity: A Constitutionaland HistoricalAnalysis of Official Efforts to Drive Homeless Personsfrom
American Cities, 66 TUL. L. REv. 631, 638-40 (1992). Before being reigned in by Papachristouand
its progeny, the laws served as widely used, potent tools for police. See William J. Stuntz, Crime
Talk and Law Talk, 23 REV. AM. HIST. 153, 157 (1995) (stating that vagrancy laws "made it
possible for police to arrest pretty much anyone, or at least anyone on the street"). For
historical accounts of the disdain for and fear of the poor, see NELS ANDERSON, THE HOBO: THE
SOCIOLOGY OF THE HOMELESS MAN 163 (1923) ("The average man on the street. . . sees in the
tramp either a parasite or a predacious individual."); Forrest W. Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes
of PersonalCondition,66 HARv. L. REv. 1203, 1203 (1953).
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Residence exclusion zones are also in keeping with more modern
efforts to conceive of crime control in terms of space and spatial design. The
theoretical foundation for this shift is evident in increasing emphasis on
"place"5 4 and geographic profiling55 in law and criminology, and in crime
control strategies such as crime-mapping56 and enhanced sanctions for
crimes committed in particular locales- 7 Consistent with this orientation,
state and local governments in recent years have endeavored to curtail social
ills by imposing location restrictions on prostitution, 58 drug use and
dealing, gang activity, 6° and trespassory behavior of the suspected criminal
element more generally. 6' The laws, as Robert Ellickson noted in a seminal
article on the subject in the mid-1990s, regard crime control as an issue of

53.

See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 101-04

(1993).

54. See generally, e.g., WILLIAM DELEON-GRANADOS, TRAvELS THROUGH CRIME AND PLACE
(1999); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (and Order in) the City, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2004); Neal
Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039 (2002); Tracey L. Meares, Place
and Crime, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 669 (1998).
55. See generally, e.g., Manne Laukkanen, Predicting the Residential Location of a Serial
Commercial Robber, 157 J. FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 71 (2006); James T. Walker et al., The Geographic
Link Between Sex Offenders and PotentialVictims; A Routine Activities Approach, 3 JUST. RES. & POL'Y
15 (2001). More recently, environmental criminologists and sociobiologists have been
investigating the possible connections between criminal activity and human/animal instinctual
traits, especially foraging. See, e.g., LUE-ALAIN GIRALDEAU & THOMAS CARACO, SOCIAL FORAGING
THEORY (2000); Steven C. Le Comber et al., Geographic Profiling and Animal Foraging, 6 J.
THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 233, 233 (2005); Chris Giles & Richard Fedora, Forensic Logic,
CrimePointWeb and Environmental Criminology, Apr. 2005, http://www.forensiclogic.com/
papers/crimepointwebenvcrim.html (follow "Papers" hyperlink in top menu).
56..

See generally, e.g., JOHN E. ECK ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, MAPPING CRIME:

UNDERSTANDING HOT SPOTS (2005); U.S. Dep't of Justice, Nat'l Inst. of Justice, Predicting a
Criminal'sJourney to Crime, NIJ J., No. 253, Jan. 2006, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
nij/journals/253/predicting.html; Kate J. Bowers et al., Prospective Hot-Spotting: The Future of
Crime Mapping?,44 BRIT.J. CRIMINOLOGY 641 (2004).
57. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-7 (West 2005) (imposing mandatory three-year prison
term upon persons convicted of distributing drugs within 1,000 feet of a school).
58. See, e.g., State v. Lhasawa, 55 P.3d 477, 479 (Or. 2002); see also Sandra L. Moser,
Comment, Anti-Prostitution Zones: Justificationsfor Abolition, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1101,
1101 (2001).
59. See, e.g., State v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857 (Ohio 2001); see also Robert L. Scharff, An
Analysis of Municipal Drug and Prostitution Exclusion Zones, 15 GEO. MASON U. CIv. RTS. L.J. 321
(2005).
60. See, e.g., People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997); see also Terence R.
Boga, Note, Turf Wars: Street Gangs, Local Governments, and the Battle for Public Space, 29 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 477 (1994).
61.
See, e.g., Thompson v. Ashe, 250 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2001) (addressing Knoxville,
Tennessee law); see also Peter M. Flanagan, Note, Trespass-Zoning: EnsuringNeighborhoods a Safer
Future by Excluding Those with a CriminalPast, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 327 (2003).
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62
"land management,"
a strategy in principle now endorsed by the Supreme
63

Court.

Residence exclusion laws, however, differ in important ways from the
aforementioned efforts. Whereas other modern zoning-type provisions
typically apply for only a limited period (ninety days to one year) 64 and
permit challenges to their individual application, 65 exclusion laws exclude
individuals for a minimum of ten years (and sometimes for life),66 and afford
no notice or right to challenge exclusion.
Furthermore, residence
exclusion laws can amount to effective exclusion from states, not merely
specified neighborhoods. 68 At the same time, the laws differ from vagrancy
and pauper laws, also predicated on status, because they rely on a static
condition (ex-offender status), which, absent pardon or other governmental
intervention, cannot be changed (unlike vagrancy or poverty).69

62. Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid
Rows and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1171 (1996). For more on recent efforts to
employ property regulation as a means to exclude criminal activity and to prevent social
disorder, see generally Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutionsfor Old Neighborhoods,48 DUKE LJ. 75
(1998); Garnett, supra note 54. For discussion of the opposite effort of government to segregate
and contain socially undesirable activity and individuals, see JOEL BEST, REGULATING BROTHEL
PROSTITUTION IN ST. PAUL, 1865-1883 (1998); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Relocating Disorder,91 VA.
L. REv. 1075, 1103-08 (2005); Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1206
(1996).
63. See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 124 (2003) (upholding authority of local public
housing authority to employ trespass laws to exclude suspected miscreants).
64. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 489 (6th Cir. 2002) (addressing
Cincinnati's prostitution-free zone), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 915 (2003).
65.
See, e.g., State v. Lhasawa, 55 P.3d 477, 480 (Or. 2002) (citing with approval provision
in local law requiring that notice and right to be heard on validity of exclusion be afforded
before exclusion occurs).
66. See, e.g.,
GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(g) (Supp. 2006) (dictating a minimum ten-year
ban); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2950.031 (A) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005) (dictating a lifetime ban).
67. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 692A.2A (2005). South Dakota's recently adopted law represents
an exception, allowing a registrant to petition to be exempted from the exclusion law if, inter
alia, ten years have elapsed since the registrant was first subject to the law, the registrant's
predicate offense did not involve a child under the age of 13, and the registrant has resided in
the state for at least ten consecutive years prior to petitioning the court. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 22-24B-27 (2006). Should the reviewing court find that the petitioner has satisfied these
requirements by clear and convincing evidence, and "that the petitioner is not likely to offend
again," the court may in its discretion grant an exemption. Id. § 22-24B-28.
68. See infra notes 115-27 and accompanying text.
69. Even so, the laws inspire a moral philosophy concern not unlike that identified by
Jeremy Waldron, who in critiquing property rights-based limits imposed on homeless
individuals, observed that "[s]ince we are embodied beings, we always have a location."Jeremy
Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. REv. 295, 296 (1991). I am indebted
to ProfessorJim Dwyer for drawing my attention to this parallel.

EX-OFFENDER RESIDENCE EXCLUSION LAWS
III. THE CURRENTJUDICIAL TERRAIN AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Given the significant consequences of residence exclusion laws for exoffenders (and their families), it should come as no surprise that the laws
have been tested in court. To date, however, all challenges have been
unsuccessful, with courts rejecting claims sounding in the Ex Post Facto
7012
73
Clause, 7 equal protection," vagueness and overbreadth, substantive and
74
75
procedural due process, and the right to travel. This Part examines the
most significant decision to date, Doe v. Miller,76 in which the Eighth Circuit
upheld Iowa's law, an outcome the Supreme Court has refused to
reconsider. 77 Finding the analysis in Miller wanting, the discussion then turns
to the significant and immediate practical consequences of state exclusion
laws and their broader national consequences, which the court failed to fully
acknowledge and appreciate.
A. DOE V.

MILLER

In 2002, the Iowa Legislature, by near unanimous vote, 78 adopted its
exclusion law, which prohibits individuals who have committed a designated
offense against a minor 79 from living within 2,000 feet of a school or child
care facility.'s Just over a year later, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Iowa certified a class of John Doe plaintiffs coming within the
ambit of the law.8' After hearing arguments and receiving expert testimony
on the law's effects, the trial court enjoined application of Iowa's residence
exclusion law, deeming it violative of the Ex Post Facto Clause, substantive
and procedural due process, and the Fifth Amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination.82

70. Lee v. State, 895 So. 2d 1038, 1044 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004); Denson v. State, 600 S.E.2d
645, 647 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
71.
People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 778 (11. App. Ct. 2005).
72. Mann v. State, 603 S.E.2d 283, 286--87 (Ga. 2004).
73. Doe v. Baker, No. Civ.Al:05-CV-2265, 2006 WL 905368, at *6-7 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 5,
2006).
74. State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 661-62, 666 (Iowa 2005).
75. Doe v. Petro, No. 1:05-CV-125, 2005 WL 1038846, at *1 (S.D. Ohio May 3, 2005).
76. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005).
77. Id., cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 757, 758 (2005).
78. Bonnie Harris, Imperfections Mar Tough Laws; Sex Offender Residency Statute Produces
Unintended Results, DES MOINES REG., Oct. 20, 2005, at IA.
79. IOWA CODE § 692A.2A(1) (2005) (targeting persons who have "committed a criminal
offense against a minor, or an aggravated offense, sexually violent offense, or other relevant
offense that involved a minor").
80. Id. § 692A.2A(2) (defining parameter as "within two thousand feet of the real property
comprising a public or nonpublic elementary or secondary school or a child care facility").
81. Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d 844, 847 (S.D. Iowa 2004), rev'd, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir.
2005).
82.

Id. at 880.
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A three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit reversed.8' Writing for the
court, Judge Colloton first rejected plaintiffs' assertion that the law violated
procedural due process because they were denied notice of the law's
application insofar as Iowa failed to provide them with information on the
location of all schools and child care facilities.8 4 Likewise, the panel rebuffed
the claim that the law violated due process because it failed to provide for
individualized determinations of dangerousness:
The restriction applies to all offenders who have been convicted of
certain crimes against minors, regardless of what estimates of
future dangerousness might be proved in individualized hearings.
Once such a legislative classification has been drawn, additional
procedures are unnecessary, because the statute does not provide a
potential exemption for individuals who seek to prove that they are
not individually dangerous or likely to offend against neighboring
schoolchildren.... [T] he absence of an individualized hearing in
connection with a statute that offers no exemptions does not
85
offend principles of procedural due process.
Turning to substantive due process, Judge Colloton first rejected
plaintiffs' contention that the law abridged their fundamental right to live
with family members.8 6 This was because rather than prescribing with whom7
live.
the plaintiffs could live, the law only limited where plaintiffs could
Furthermore, unlike prior Supreme Court cases finding fault with laws that
directly limited familial living arrangements, 8 Iowa's residence exclusion law
had only "an incidental or unintended effect on the family."8 9 According to
Judge Colloton, while the law affected residency choices, it did "not directly
regulate the family relationship or prevent any family member from residing
with a sex offender in a residence that is consistent with the statute." 90
Next, Judge Colloton summarily rejected plaintiffs' assertion that the
law violated the right to interstate travel by limiting ingress and egress to and
from Iowa. This was because the 2,000 foot buffer, as a technical matter,
imposed "no obstacle" insofar as it did not "erect an 'actual barrier to
interstate movement."' 9 ' Nor did the law transgress equality "by treating
nonresidents who visit Iowa any differently than current residents, or by

83.
84.

Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 701 (8th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 708-09.

85.

Id. at 709.

86.
87.

Id. at 711.
Id. at 710.

88. Miller, 405 F.3d at 710 (citing and discussing, inter alia, Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977)).

89.
90.

Id.
Id. at 711.

91.

Id. at 712 (citation omitted).
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discriminating against citizens of other States who wish to establish residence
in Iowa." 92 According to Judge Colloton, "[t]hat the statute might deter
some out-of-state residents from traveling to Iowa because the prospects for
a convenient and affordable residence are less promising than elsewhere
does not implicate a fundamental right ....93
For similar reasons, the court concluded that Iowa's law did not infringe
any posited right to intrastate travel.94 Noting that the Supreme Court has
not expressly recognized such a right 95 (despite several circuits having done
so),9 6 Judge Colloton accepted for argument's sake that it existed. 97
However, any right to travel within Iowa was not infringed because the
state's exclusion law only proscribed residency. It did not "prevent a sex
offender from entering or leaving any part of the State, including areas
within 2,000 feet of a school or a child,,98
care -facility, and it does not erect any
actual barrier to intrastate movement. Judge Colloton was also at pains to
reject any asserted right to "live where you want," which he referred to as an
"ambitious articulation of [an] unenumerated right."99
Having found that the Iowa law did not infringe any fundamental right,
the court proceeded to conclude that the law satisfied rational basis scrutiny.
Despite the absence of any evidence showing that exclusion to any degree
actually fulfilled the state's avowed goal of protecting children, or that the
2,000 foot limit in particular was appropriate, the court deemed the law to
be well within the state's police power authority to "protect the health and
welfare of its citizens."' 0 Citing prior Supreme Court pronouncements on
the posited disproportionately high recidivism risks of sex offenders, 19 '

92. Id. In point of fact, however, "current residents" are treated differently, as they are in
several other states with exclusion laws, insofar as exclusion does not apply to those who resided
within the prescribed radius before implementation of the law. See IOWA CODE § 692A.2A(4) (c)

(2005).
93. Miller, 405 F.3d at 712. In so concluding, the court specifically disclaimed the trial
court's concern that the law might sweep up visitors to Iowa who "unwittingly fall asleep" at a
temporary residence such as a homeless shelter, hotel, motel, or mission. Id. at 712 n.3. This was
because plaintiffs abandoned the contention and the record otherwise lacked evidence
supporting the proximity of such temporary shelters to schools and child care facilities. Id.
94. Id.at 713.
95. Id. (citing Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1974)).
96. Id. (citing Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 496-98 (6th Cir. 2002); Lutz v.
City of York, Pa., 899 F.2d 255, 266 (3d Cir. 1990); King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442
F.2d 646, 647-48 (2d Cir. 1971)).
97. Id.
98. Miller, 405 F.3d at 713.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 714.
101.
Id. at 714-15. According to the court:
There can be no doubt of a legislature's rationality in believing that "[s]ex
offenders are a serious threat in this Nation," and that "[wihen convicted sex
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Judge Colloton concluded that Iowa was entitled to use "common sense" in
employing residence exclusion as a social control strategy and to settle upon
the particular spatial boundary adopted.' 2
Finally, after giving short shrift to the trial court's decision finding a
Fifth Amendment violation, 0 3Judge Colloton, writing for himself and Judge
Riley, and over the dissent of Judge Melloy,' °4 held that Iowa's law did not
constitute retroactive punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Applying the multi-factor test used to determine whether a given sanction
qualifies as punishment, 10 5 Judge Colloton concluded that Iowa's exclusion
provision was neither punitive in intent nor effect. First, the law did not
qualify as punishment as a matter of history or tradition. Although exclusion
resembled banishment, an acknowledged punitive sanction, the Iowa law did
not expressly expel plaintiffs; it "restrict[ed] only where offenders may
reside." 1 6 Second, the law did not promote the traditional punishment aims
of retribution and deterrence. While the restraints and requirements of the
law had some retributive impact, such effects were not inconsistent with the
"regulatory objective of protecting the health and safety of children. "'"As
for deterrence, while exclusion might have some deterrent effect, it was
primarily intended to "reduce the likelihood of reoffense by limiting the
offender's
temptation and reducing the opportunity to commit a new
" °
crime. ,,e.108

Turning to the other factors, Judge Colloton agreed that Iowa's law
imposed an "affirmative disability or restraint," °9 but he concluded that
evidence supporting the fourth and final factor-whether the law had a
"rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose"' 0-was present. Imposing a
residence exclusion limit was a rational and nonexcessive way to achieve the
legislature's avowed regulatory end, even though it applied to individuals
regardless of particularized risk. 1 ' According to Judge Colloton:

offenders reenter society, they are much more likely than any other type of
offender to be re-arrested for a new rape or sexual assault."
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4 (2003)).
102. Id. at 715-16.
103. Miller, 405 F.3d at 716. The privilege against compelled self-incrimination was not
implicated, the court reasoned, because the law "regulates only where the sex offender may
reside; it does not require him to provide any information that might be used against him in a
criminal case." Id.
104. Id. at 723 (MelloyJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
105. Id. at 718-19 (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 93-94 (2003); Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)).

106.
107.

Id. at 719.
Id.

108.

Miller, 405 F.3d at 720.
Id.
Id. at 721.
Id. at 721-22.

109.
110.
111.
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In view of the higher-than-average risk of reoffense posed by
convicted sex offenders, and the imprecision involved in predicting
what measures will best prevent recidivism, we do not believe the
Does have established that Iowa's decision to restrict all such
offenders from residing near schools and child care facilities
constitutes punishment despite the legislature's regulatory
purpose.

112

Nor, again, was it constitutionally relevant that the record lacked support for
the crime control efficacy of exclusion in general and the 2,000 foot
parameter in particular. Exclusion was simply a policy choice for the Iowa
Legislature to make.113
B.

THE NATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OFEXCLUSION

Miller represents the most significant judicial treatment of a state
exclusion law to date. Future decisions will likely regard its rationales and
the constitutionally permissible provisions of the challenged Iowa law as
benchmarks to condone other state laws. 1 4 Moreover, given the potent
political appeal of exclusion, there is every reason to expect that exclusion
laws will continue to proliferate among the states.
In light of this, it is well to consider the practical effects of exclusion.
For instance, in Iowa, as noted by the Miller trial court, the 2,000 foot5
parameter renders off-limits virtually all of Des Moines and Iowa City."1
Moreover, "[i]n smaller towns that have a school or child care facility, the
entire town is often engulfed by an excluded area .... 6 To the Eighth
Circuit panel in Miller, these effects were of no moment because,
theoretically at least, residential options within Iowa remained available.
This view, however, ignores the actual effect of exclusion laws. In Iowa,
as in other states with residential prohibitions,"' theory conflicts with reality:

112. Id. at 722.
113. Miller, 405 F.3d at 723.
114. For two such examples, see Weems v. Little Rock PoliceDep't, 453 F.3d 1010, 1014-15 (8th
Cir. 2006) (relying on Miller to uphold Arkansas residence exclusion law); Doe v. Baker, No.
Civ.A 1:05-CV-2265, 2006 WL 905368, at *3-4 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (relying on Miller to uphold
Georgia residence exclusion law).
115. Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d 844, 851 (S.D. Iowa 2004), rev'd, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir.

2005).
116. Id.; see also Miller, 405 F.3d at 725 (Melloy,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(noting that "[tihe effect of the requirement is quite dramatic: many offenders cannot live with
their families and/or cannot live in their home communities because the whole community is a
restricted area").
117. See, e.g., Shannon Muchmore, Registration Law Backfire Forecast, TULSA WORLD, July 7,
2006, at Al (discussing Oklahoma law); New Rule Will Force Most Sex Offenders in Lexington to
Move, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Ky.), June 9, 2006 (discussing Kentucky law); Phillip Reese
& Amy Upshaw, Sex Offenders in Cities Have Little Room to Live: 2000-Foot Rule Squeezes Out Convicts,
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housing options are actually far fewer, given that much of the theoretically
available space outside exclusion zones is industrial in nature or residences
are so expensive as to be beyond the financial means of individuals targeted
by the laws."' Moreover, in Iowa, as in other states," 9 towns, counties, and
cities, anxious that individuals forced to flee more heavily populated areas
will flood their domains (as they often have), frequently augment state limits
and seek to outdo (or at least match) one another in their restrictive criteria
by adding to state-prescribed geographic anchor points (e.g., swimming
2
12 1
pools) 120 and distances. As a result, ever more space is placed off-limits.12

The upshot is that the residential prohibitions, in conjunction with the
already acutely diminished
range of housing options 124available to ex123
offenders, 12 can effectively result in state-wide exclusion. Other states, in
turn, alarmed that they will become a magnet for ex-offenders, 2 5 or if
ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, Nov. 30, 2003, at 1 (discussing Arkansas law); David Simpson et al.,

Law & Order,ATL. J.-CONST., June 24, 2006, at 3E (discussing Georgia law).
118. Judge Melloy recognized this reality in his dissent, noting that "there are so few legal
housing options that many offenders face the choice of living in rural areas or leaving the
state ....
This effectively results in banishment from virtually all of Iowa's cities and larger
towns." Miller, 405 F.3d at 724 (Melloy, J., dissenting); cf Jason S. Alloy, Note, "158-County
Banishment" in Georgia: ConstitutionalImplications Under the State Constitutionand the Federal Right to
Travel, 36 GA. L. REV. 1083, 1099, 1103 (2002) (discussing practice in Georgia where
prosecutors, facing a constitutional bar on state-wide banishment, exclude probationers from
all but one state county, a very rural area with few housing, transportation or work options,
which triggers migration by probationers).
119.
See, e.g., Ellen Perlman, Where Will Sex Offenders Live?, GOVERNING MAG.,June 2006, at
54 (discussing "domino effect" of Miami's 2,500 foot exclusion zone vis-a-vis neighboring
localities).
120.
See Monica Davey, Iowa's Residency Rules Drive Sex Offenders Underground, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 15, 2006, at Al; Mike McWilliams, Town Looking to Tighten Law, IOWA CIT PRESS-CITIZEN,
Dec. 3, 2005, at IA (noting that nearly two dozen counties and cities, including Des Moines,
have augmented state geographic anchor points); see also, e.g., Kent Mallet, Newark Limits Where
Sex Offenders Can Live, NEWARK ADVOC. (Ohio), Jan. 18, 2006 (noting unanimous vote by city
council of Newark, Ohio to expand state exclusion coverage beyond schools to licensed daycare
centers, parks, playgrounds, and swimming pools).
121. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. As noted above, such local augmentation is
possibly vulnerable to preemption challenge. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
Preemption can be avoided, however, by express state legislative delegation. For instance, under
California's upcoming ballot initiative, local governments would enjoy authority to expand
restrictions to other sites, such as libraries. SeeJim Miller, Jessica's Law: Effort to Keep Abusers Away,
PRESS-ENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.),Jan. 1, 2006, at Al.
122. This phenomenon, it bears mention, is directly affected by the relative population
densities of states: for instance, residence exclusion focal points in Florida, a heavily developed
and populated state, will have greater spatial exclusionary effect than those in more rural states
such as New Mexico or South Dakota, with their relative lesser population densities and fewer
geographic focal points for exclusion.
123. See TRAVIS, supra note 11, at 219-48.
124. See Emily Kittle, Sex Offenders Fall Off Radar, TELEGRAPH HERALD (Dubuque, Iowa),Jan.
27, 2006, at Al (noting that many offenders from Dubuque County, Iowa lacked housing
options and moved to Wisconsin, Illinois, Texas, and Nevada).
125. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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embrace exclusion as a
otherwise enamored of the strategy in principle,
social control measure. This relegates those states that are slow, or perhaps
being at least), to enacting exclusion laws to
even averse (for the time
27

1
dumping-ground status.

In voicing their support for such laws, state and local politicians are
refreshingly unabashed in identifying their ultimate desire: to purge their
domains of ex-offenders. 1 ' They feel free to speak with such candor,
confident in the widespread public appeal of their positions, despite the
dubious practical effects of the laws.1 29 Indeed, available research suggests
that exclusion neither deters nor prevents reoffense by persons with
histories of criminal sexual misconduct, given that individuals bent on
committing such crimes can (and logically will) travel beyond their
residences.1 3 0 Adding to this false sense of security is the empirical reality
that the overwhelming majority of persons committing acts of sexual abuse
126. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 121 (discussing pending California ballot initiative, to be
voted upon in November 2006, that would ban registrants from living within 2,000 feet of
schools and parks and predicting its likely success).
127. To date, a handful of states have resisted enacting laws. See Tom Fahey, House Panel
OKs Sex PredatorLaw Changes, UNION LEADER (Manchester, N.H.), Mar. 17, 2006, at A9; Karen
Madden, Offenders Among Us: ParentsFearSex Offenders Living Near 3 Rapids Schools, WIS. RAPIDS
DAILY TRIB., May 27, 2006, at IA; Larry Pozner, Restrictions Unfair to Sex Offenders, DENVER POST,
Feb. 12, 2006, at E-03.
128. See, e.g., Matthew S.L. Cate, Perdue Signs Bill Targeting Sex Offenders, CHATTANOOGA
TIMES FREE PRESS, Apr. 27, 2006, at BI (noting that many legislative supporters of Georgia's law
hope "it will drive sex offenders out of the state"); Kent Faulk, Tighter Restrictions Set for Sex
Offenders, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, June 7, 2006, at lB (quoting Jasper, Alabama, Mayor Sonny Posey
in wake of the city council approving a one-mile exclusion zone: "I don't reckon we're trying to
hide the fact that we're not interested in those folks being around"); Jason Garcia, State May
Crack Down on Predators, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 14, 2005, at Al (quoting Florida State
Representative Susan Goldstein to the effect that the goal of Florida's exclusion law is "to get
these people out of our neighborhoods and hopefully out of our state").
129. As noted by Rebecca Cohn, a member of the California Assembly: "You can have all
the experts weigh in on the practicality of this, but we need to take care of our children." Mark
Martin, California's Most Unwanted: Restrictions on Residency Make Nomads of ParoledSex Offenders,
S.F. CHRON., June 2, 2006, at Al.
See COLO. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, REPORT ON SAFETY ISSUES RAISED BY LIVING
130.
ARRANGEMENTS FOR AND LOCATION OF SEX OFFENDERS IN THE COMMUNITY 4 (2004), available at

http:/dcj.state.co.us/odvsom (follow "resources," then follow "reports") ("Placing restrictions
on the location of ... supervised sex offender residences may not deter the sex offender from
re-offending and should not be considered as a method to control sexual offending
recidivism."); MINN. DEP'T OF CORR., LEVEL THREE SEX OFFENDERS RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT
ISSUES: 2003 REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 9, 11 (2003) [hereinafter MINN. DEP'T OF CORR.,

LEVEL THREE], available at http://www.doc.state.mn.us (follow "publications") (finding "no
evidence" that "residential proximity of sex offenders to school or parks affects reoffense" and
noting that an offender "is more likely to travel to another neighborhood in order to act in
secret rather than in a neighborhood where his or her picture is well known"); Jill S. Levenson
& Leo P. Cotter, The Impact of Sex Offender Residency Restrictions: 1,000 Feet from Danger or One Step
from Absurd?, 49 INT'LJ. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 168, 174 (2005) (providing
self-report data indicating that exclusion zones have no practical effect on the likelihood of
recidivism in targeted areas).
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against children, rather than being anonymous strangers in neighborhoods,
are known by their victims."' Perhaps even more troubling, there is reason
to believe that the laws are actually counterproductive. Exclusion very likely
impedes development of familial, social, and therapeutic networks shown to
reduce risk of recidivism, and discourages individuals from reporting their
whereabouts, undercutting the core public awareness purpose of
registration (and community notification) .I3
Given this climate, the problematic quality of the Eighth Circuit's
approval of Iowa's "common sense" decision becomes even more apparent.
By casting a blind eye to the broader systemic effects of exclusion, the court
condoned (indeed, encouraged) the natural defensive competitiveness of
states on criminal justice matters. I1 4 Furthermore, by failing to require a
demonstrated link between the recidivist threat and the types of individuals
36
targeted,135 and the evidence on the efficacy of exclusion more generally,

131.
HOWARD N. SNYDER, U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEXUAL ASSAULT OF YOUNG
CHILDREN AS REPORTED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT: VICTIM,
INCIDENT, AND OFFENDER
CHARACTERISTICS 10 (2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/saycrle.pdf
(noting that only seven percent of offenders implicated in sexual assault of victims under age
seventeen were "strangers").
132.
See, e.g., R. KARL HANSON & KELLY MORTION-BOURGON, PUB. SAFETY & EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS CAN., PREDICTORS OF SEXUAL RECIDIVISM: AN UPDATED META-ANALYSIS 10 (2004),
availableat http://ww2.psepc-sppcc.gc.ca/publications/collections/pdf/200402 e.pdf; Candace
Kruttscnitt et al., Predictors ofDesistance Among Sex Offenders: The Interactionof Formal and Informal
Social Controls, 17JUST. Q. 61, 82 (2000); see also MINN. DEP'T OF CORR., LEVEL THREE, supra note
130, at 9 (noting that exclusion creates problems such as "isolation; lack of work, education,
and treatment options"); MINN. DEP'T OF CORR., SAFE HOMES, SAFE COMMUNITIES: A FOCUS
GROUP REPORT ON OFFENDER HOUSING 9 (2001), available at http://www.corr.state.mn.us/
publications/pdf/housing.pdf (noting that sex offenders who are unable to find stable living
situations are more likely to revert to "an antisocial lifestyle").
133. See Kittle, supra note 124, at Al (citing Iowa Department of Corrections data indicating
that after the law's passage, twice as many individuals now fail to fulfill their registration
requirements); Eileen Mozinski, Attorneys State Law's Flaws; Iowa Association Says Sex Offender
Residency Restrictions Are Ineffective and Counterproductive,TELEGRAPH HERALD (Dubuque, Iowa),
Jan. 24, 2006, at Al (citing study by Iowa County Attorneys Association indicating increased
propensity among registrants to report false addresses).
134.
See Wayne A. Logan, Crime, Criminals, and Competitive Crime Control, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1733, 1733 (2006) ("Given the negative consequences of crime, it should come as no surprise
that states will endeavor to make their dominions less hospitable to potential criminal actors.").
135.
With their broad scope of application, the laws resemble what Henry Smith has
observed with respect to exclusionary property regimes more generally, whereby exclusion
represents "a low-cost, but low-precision method that relies on rough informational
variables... to define legal entitlements." Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law
of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 981 (2004).
136. See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 709, 721-22 (8th Cir. 2005). A similar insouciance was
expressed by the Illinois Court of Appeals, which in rejecting a challenge to Illinois' law stated:
Although the record is bare of any statistics or research correlating residency
distance with sex offenses, we conclude that it is reasonable to believe that a law
that prohibits child sex offenders from living within 500 feet of a school will reduce
[sex offenses against children] .... Although it is not clear from the record how

EX-OFFENDERRESIDENCE EXCLUSION LAWS
Miller creates a slippery slope, increasing the likelihood that other offender
be targeted'3 7 and that more ambitious geographic limits will
sub-groups will
3 8
be imposed.

As a result, as the laws gain favor, a classic tragedy of the commons
problem is now taking shape, with sections of the nation placed off-limits,'3 9
states exporting negative externalities in the form of increased social welfare
4
costs associated with offender reentry (e.g., job training, treatment),1 0 and
4
4
to the extent criminal propensity is displaced, 1 criminal victimization1 and

the distance of 500 feet was decided upon, we believe that 500 feet is a reasonable
distance.
People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 777 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
137. See Joan Petersilia, Community Corrections, in CRIME: PUBLIC POLICIES FOR CRIME
CONTROL 483, 500 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 2002) (noting rapid expansion of
registration laws to include nonsexual offenses and offenses not involving minors); Kris Wise,
Bill Sets Up Registry for Meth Lab Crimes, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL (W. Va.), June 12, 2006, at IA
(noting that Tennessee and Illinois subject persons convicted of operating methamphetamine
labs to registration and community notification and that several other states are considering
such expansions).
138. See, e.g., Jennifer Sorentrue, Tougher Sex-Offender Limits Raise Issues, PALM BEACH POST
(Fla.), June 20, 2006, at 4B (quoting a county commissioner in Palm Beach County, Florida, a
locality that enacted a 2,500 foot buffer to augment the state's 1,000 foot limit: "If they ask me
to make it 5,000 feet, I'd vote for it."). On the phenomenon of legislative slippery slopes more
generally, see Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 103536 (2003).
139. One subtle but important functional aspect of this boundary setting is that it
undercuts the mobility thought characteristic of and necessary to collective national identity. As
Professor Todd Pettys has observed, "Americans' mobility plays a significant role in creating
[the] widespread perception of national community-citizens' own geographic paths and those
of their families, friends, and colleagues create connections and associations that touch farreaching areas of the nation." Todd E. Pettys, The Mobility Paradox,92 GEO. L.J. 481, 514 (2004).
140.

See TRAVIS, supra note 11, passim

141. The actual occurrence of migration in response to draconian state criminal justice
policies remains somewhat in empirical doubt. For a discussion of this possibility, based on
largely anecdotal evidence, see Doron Teichman, The Market for CriminalJustice:Federalism, Crime
Control, andJurisdictionalCompetition, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1831, 1839-57 (2005). Indeed, Charles
Tiebout, the progenitor of the rational choice jurisdictional competitiveness model on which
the theory is based, acknowledged that his model artificially presumes adequate legal
knowledge of comparative differences relative to government policy. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure
Theory of Local Expenditures, 64J. POL. ECON. 416, 419 (1956).
Given the socially disadvantaged backgrounds common to ex-offenders, there arguably
exists even less potential for self-education. Cf Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II-Localism
and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 420-21 (1990) (noting that mobility is constrained by
.economic and social factors that tend to affect poorer people more than affluent ones" and
that business owners and capital investors are more sensitive to relocation options). Whatever
the broader empirical reality, the accumulated evidence regarding the laws examined here
supports such a displacement effect, i.e., that targeted individuals are fleeing states with
exclusion laws, which is understandable given that individuals face the immediate, drastic
consequence of exclusion, making them logically more cognizant of other states' policies.
142. While recidivism rates vary significantly among offender subpopulations, aggregate
data are troubling: approximately two-thirds of released prisoners are rearrested within three
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Not only are such burdens shifted elsewhere-with more densely
populated states (and subpolities within them144 ) naturally benefiting
its

costs.

most,' 45 but so are the nature and quality of the burdens expelled. This is

because the ex-offenders who are forced to move likely experience greater
reentry challenges 146 and law enforcement in receiving locales are
disadvantaged insofar as they lack familiarity with the backgrounds of
imigris, undercutting their ability to monitor them. 47
Ultimately, the socio-political dynamic giving rise to exclusion laws
summons to mind core public policy concerns that long ago prompted
judicial condemnation of state banishment laws. As recognized by the
Supreme Court of Michigan more than seventy-five years ago, in a time
marked by similar acute public anxiety over crime:
To permit one state to dump its convict criminals into another
would entitle the state believing itself injured thereby to exercise its
police and military power .

.

. to repel such an invasion. It would

tend to incite dissension, provoke retaliation, and disturb that
fundamental equality of political rights
among the several states
148
which is the basis of the Union itself.
years of release. PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVIDJ. LEVIN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUBL'N NO. NCJ
193427, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994, at 1 (2002), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf.
143. On the fiscal consequences of crime control, encompassing police, judicial, and
correctional outlays, which account for increasingly large portions of state budgetary
expenditures, see KRISTEN A. HUGHES, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PUBL'N NO. NCJ 2122603, JUSTICE
EXPENDITURES AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 2003, at 1 (2006), available at

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/jeeus03.pdf (noting that in 2003 criminal justice
expenditures accounted for roughly 7.2% of all state and local expenditures). Total state justice
system expenditures increased from $34 billion in 1992 to over $66 billion in 2003, a 94%
increase. Id. at 5.
144.
See NANCY G. LA VIGNE &JAKE COWAN, URBAN INSTITUTE, MAPPING PRISONER REENTRY:
AN ACTION RESEARCH GUIDEBOOK 6, 9 (2005), available at http://www.urban.org/

uploadedPDF/411250_RMNguidebook.pdf (discussing significant tendency of released
prisoners to reside in urban areas upon expiration of their terms). In this respect, the reality
that local governments-cities, towns, and counties-largely cover expenses for main
components of crime control, especially police, prosecutors, and jails, has special significance.
See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of CriminalJustice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 788, 809
(2006) (discussing local expenditures).
145. As noted by Jeremy Travis, former head of the National Institute of Justice, "most
prisoners are incarcerated in, and therefore released in, a small number of states." TRAVIS, supra
note 11, at 286; see also id. at 281 (noting uneven distribution of reentry populations).
146. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
147. See Harris, supra note 78, at IA (noting same concern expressed by state law
enforcement official).
148. People v. Baum, 231 N.W. 95, 96 (Mich. 1930); see also State v. Doughtie, 74 S.E.2d
922, 924 (N.C. 1953) (observing that "[i]t is not sound public policy to make other states a
dumping ground for our criminals"). Moreover, the dynamic naturally lends itself to intrastate
ill will as well. This is because localities within states can be differentially affected; for instance,
suburbs and rural areas with fewer geographic focal points such as schools have a lesser capacity
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IV. A NATIONAL SOLUTION FOR A NATIONAL CHALLENGE
As is evident from the foregoing discussion, residence exclusion laws
create a collective action problem of national proportion. Individual states,
eager to expel and repel ex-offenders, left to their own devices, have
indulged their natural tendency to behave in a manner oblivious to the
interests of their sister states. 49 This dynamic, as discussed next, is both
contrary to the long-term, practical interests of the union, of which
individual states are a part, and betrays the nation's sustaining constitutional
traditions and history that have given force to this recognition.

A.

COLLECTIWST TRADITIONS

As noted earlier, the Constitution originated out of a recognized need
to more effectively unify the states and to curb individual state tendencies to
act in self-interested ways that are harmful to one another and to the union
as a whole."O To this end, the Framers designed a federalist structure of
governance anchored by the Supremacy Clause,"' empowering a central
authority to trump discordant state regulations, complemented by a variety
of unity-enforcing provisions that impose negative constraints and
affirmative obligations on the states vis-a-vis one another.
Perhaps chief among such constraints is the Compact Clause, which
seeks to head off possible cabalistic tendencies among states. 152 Other limits
include express prohibitions on the capacity of states to create and use their
own specie, 53 impose duties 55
on imports or exports," 4 and maintain
navies.
independent armies and
In terms of affirmative obligations, the Framers, as well as drafters of the
Civil War era amendments, sought to ensure interstate cooperation and
respect. Article IV, for instance, requires that states afford "Full Faith and
Credit" to one another's official acts and records 156 and that they honor

to exclude targeted individuals compared to urban areas. See, e.g., Bill Ainsworth, Backers
Turning Against Tough Molester Initiative; Residency Limits Raise Concerns, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.
(San Diego), Apr. 25, 2006, at Al (noting concern of rural and suburban lawmakers that
California's pending state-wide law will have such an effect). However, as noted above, the
California law, if approved as predicted, will expressly authorize localities to expand on
geographic focal criteria. See supranote 121.
149. See Ronald McKinnon & Thomas Nechyba, Competition in Federal Systems, in THE NEW
FEDERALISM: CAN THE STATES BE TRUSTED? 3, 6 (John Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast eds., 1997)
(noting incentives of states to export social problems to neighboring states).
150. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
151. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
152. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress .. . enter into
any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign power...
153. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
154. Id.
155. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
156. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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other states' requests for criminal extradition 15 7 (even if the alleged
misconduct serving as the basis for extradition is not criminalized by the
asylum state). 5,8 Likewise, Article IV further requires that the "Citizens of
each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities in the several
States," 5 9 while the Fourteenth Amendment commands that "[n]o State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States." 16°
For its part, over the decades the Supreme Court has often invoked
fidelity to shared national interests when addressing the constitutionality of
actions by particular states.16 ' This tendency has been readily apparent in its
privileges and immunities jurisprudence, which, despite its nascent crabbed
reading in the Slaughter-House Cases,'6' has come to assume an unmistakable
collectivist cast. Most notably, in Saenz v. Roe, 16 the Court invoked the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate
a California law limiting public-assistance benefits paid to newly arrived
residents, tying benefit amounts to what newcomers received in their
erstwhile state residences. Writing for the seven-member majority, Justice
Stevens concluded that California's law violated the right to travel implicit in
the Clause, insofar as it treated newcomers less favorably than current
residents.' 64 Concluding, Justice Stevens invoked the broader structural
purpose of nationhood animating the Clause (combined with the
Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment), 165 which the California
law imperiled:
Citizens of the United States, whether rich or poor, have the right
to choose to be citizens "of the State wherein they reside." U.S.
157.

Id. art. IV, § 2.

158.

See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 2 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 12.7 (3d ed. 1999 & Supp. 2006). Similarly, before being
superseded by the Thirteenth Amendment, the Fugitive Slave Clause compelled states to
surrender runaway slaves to their states of origin. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
159. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
160. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
161.
See Timothy Zick, Statehood as the New Personhood: The Discovery of Fundamental "States'
Rights," 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 213, 333 (2004) ("The Court has on many occasions, and in
myriad contexts, encouraged an attitude of national unity rather than selfish state concern.").
This is not to say that the Court has consistently invoked collectivism when addressing
potentially divisive state regulatory efforts. For discussion of what one author calls the
"entitlements" (noncollectivist) and "fidelity" (collectivist) approaches to federal stategovernment oversight, with the former regarded as dominant, see generally Daniel Halberstam,
Of Power and Responsibility: The PoliticalMorality of FederalSystems, 90 VA. L. REv. 731 (2004).
162. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
163. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
164. Id. at 502-04.
165. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside.").

EX-OFFENDERRESIDENCEEXCLUSION LAWS
Const., Amdt. 14, § 1. The States, however, do not have any right to
select their citizens. The Fourteenth Amendment, like the
Constitution itself, was, as Justice Cardozo put it, "framed upon the
theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim
together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in
union and not division. " 6
Collectivism has been equally, if not more, evident in the Court's long
line of cases interpreting the Dormant Commerce Clause ("DCC"). Deriving
from the negative authority implied by the powers expressly afforded
Congress under the Commerce Clause to "regulate Commerce ... among
the several States,"167 the DCC prevents states from "erect[ing] barriers
against interstate trade."168 DCC doctrine, which
extends beyond the narrow
S169
economic realm in which it ostensibly operates, seeks to ensure "national
solidarity," 70 a purpose James Madison regarded as more important than
the affirmative grant of congressional authority embedded in the Commerce
Clause itself." ToS ••this172 end, the DCC combats
state efforts designed to
173
promote protectionism and isolationism.
Privileges and immunities and DCC jurisprudence thus plainly share a
kindred concern for national collective interests174 and provide a prime
(albeit not exclusive) jurisprudential manifestation of collectivism. To
further illustrate this tradition and highlight the particularly problematic
nature of residence exclusion laws vis-A-vis collectivism, the discussion next
turns to two of the Court's DCC decisions in particular-one limiting state
authority to exclude indigents and the other limiting state authority to
exclude solid and liquid waste.
.

166. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 510-11 (quoting Baldwin v. C.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523
(1935)); see also Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm. of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978)
(condemning state distinctions that "hinder the formation, the purpose, or the development of
a single Union of those States").
167. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
168. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986) (quoting Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc.,
447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980)). For a helpful overview of the historic evolution of the DCC, see
Norman R. Williams, Wy Congress May Not "Overrule" the Dormant Commerce Clause, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 153, 160-65 (2005).
169. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-6, at 1060 (3d ed. 2000)
(observing that "'discrimination' [does not] necessarily depend on economic analysis").
170. Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 523.
171. W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 n.9 (1994).
172.
SeeWyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992).
173. See Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 339-40 (1992).
174. See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531-32 (1978) (noting the "mutually reinforcing
relationship between the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2, and the Commerce
Clause-a relationship that stems from . . . their shared vision of federalism").
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TRASH, AND INDIVDUAL STATE INTERESTS

75
In Edwards v. California,1
the Court addressed whether a state could
isolate itself from the nation's broader economic maladies by shunning the
poor. California, reeling from the effects of the Great Depression, enacted a
law making it a misdemeanor to bring into the State "'any indigent person
who is not a resident of the State.- 17 6 Edwards knowingly brought his
indigent brother-in-law into California and was convicted of a
misdemeanor. 77 Framing the issue as whether the "Okie Law" was within
California's police power authority, the Court acknowledged the major
difficulties facing states as a result of the masses of itinerant poor then
moving about the land:

The grave and perplexing social and economic dislocation which
this statute reflects is a matter of common knowledge and concern
.... We appreciate that the spectacle of large segments of our
population constantly on the move has given rise to urgent
demands on the ingenuity of government .... The State asserts

that the huge influx of migrants into California in recent years has
resulted in problems of health, morals, and especially finance, the
proportions178of which are staggering. It is not for us to say that this
is not true.

At the same time, however, the Edwards Court refused to condone
California's effort to isolate itself from the nation's economic woes and
responsibility for the poor. While "[i]t is frequently the case that a State
might gain a momentary respite from the pressure of events by the simple
expedient of shutting its gates to the outside world," recent experience
made clear that "in an industrial society the task of providing assistance to
the needy has ceased to be local in character." 7 9 As a member of the federal
union, California was obliged to shoulder the shared obligation of assisting
the poor, which in modern times had become "the common responsibility
and concern of the whole nation." 80 Its refusal to do so imposed an
impermissible barrier upon interstate commerce insofar as the free
interstate passage of all citizens, including the poor, affected commerce.
Furthermore, the law was problematic in political process terms because it
deprived nonresident indigents, the targets of the law, "of the opportunity to

175. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
176. Id. at 171 (quoting CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 2615 (Deering 1937)).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 173.
179. Id. at 173, 174-75.
180. Edwards, 314 U.S. at 175.
181.
Id.at 174, 176.
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exert political pressure
upon the California Legislature in order to obtain a
18 2
change in policy."

In short, California's effort at exclusion, despite its understandable
fiscal and social motivations, exceeded its police power authority. In
reaching its result, the Court tempered its historic deference to state laws
repelling socially undesirable individuals, dating back to City of New York v.
Miln. Miln upheld the "necessary" right of New York to bar "the moral
pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and possibly convicts." 8 4 Such a right, the
Miln Court concluded, was as innate as the right "to guard against physical
pestilence, which may arise from unsound and infectious Articles
imported, " so and was a "regulation not of commerce, but of police."8 6
Under this broad aegis, New York enjoyed the right to control those persons
"obnoxious to the law" and to "guard, by anticipation, against the
commission of an offence against its laws."' 7 Just over a century later,
however, California's exclusion of the poor was deemed an impermissible
encroachment on interstate commerce, not a lawful exercise of police
power, which, while perhaps not equating the poor with "moral pestilence,"
was nonetheless impermissible. 118
In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,'s9 decided in 1978, the Court again
was faced with a state effort to isolate itself from a societal problem of
national scope-trash. 19° Concerned about the diminution of its available
landfill space, as well as the adverse environmental consequences of treating
and disposing of waste,' 9' the NewJersey Legislature 9 banned
the entry of all
2
solid and liquid waste generated outside NewJersey.
Before reaching the merits of the Dormant Commerce Clause claim,
the seven-member majority first rejected the finding by the New Jersey
Supreme Court that the trash targeted by the prohibition did not qualify as

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 174.
City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102 (1837).
Id. at 142.
Id. at 142-43.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 140.
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 176 (1941) (quoting Miln, 36 U.S. at 142).
City of Phila. v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).

190.

For discussion of the interstate "garbage wars," waged between garbage-importing and

garbage-exporting states, see generally Robert R.M. Verchick, The Commerce Clause,
EnvironmentalJustice, and the Interstate Garbage Wars, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 1239 (1997).
191. See City of Phila., 437 U.S. at 625 (citing and discussing chapter 363 of 1973 New Jersey
laws).
192. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:11-10 (West Supp. 1978) ("No person shall bring into this State
any solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the
state . . . ."). Pursuant to the law, the State Commissioner of Environmental Protection
exempted four categories of waste from the prohibition, including materials intended for
recycling and to be used to feed swine. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:1-4.2 (Supp. 1977).
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"commerce." 9 3 Much as the Edwards Court broadly read the Clause to
include the interstate movement of indigent individuals, 94 the majority
deemed "valueless waste" as articles of commerce worthy of constitutional
scrutiny. 195 While some "innately harmful articles," 196 such as those spreading
disease or contagion ultimately might not qualify, as allowed by older
precedent of the Court, the majority concluded that no object is per se
excluded. The states rightfully banned innately harmful objects because
their "worth in interstate commerce was far outweighed by the dangers
inhering in their very movement." 97 The majority in City of Philadelphia,
however, rejected the conclusion that "valueless" trash came within this
exception.9
Having established that the prohibition of trash warranted Commerce
Clause scrutiny, the Court proceeded to invalidate New Jersey's law. Like
other "parochial legislation," such as that successfully challenged in Edwards,
"a presumably legitimate goal was sought to be achieved by the illegitimate
means of isolating the State from the national economy."199 The law
impermissibly imposed on other states "the full burden of conserving the
State's remaining landfill space " 2°° and amounted to an "attempt by one
State to isolate itself from a problem common
to many by erecting a barrier
20
against the movement of interstate trade. '

Taken together, Edwards and City of Philadelphia provide a prime
illustration

of collectivist jurisprudence.

Each

decision

balanced

the

acknowledged challenges presented by the targets of state exclusionary
efforts-the poor and waste-against the broader national obligation to
address what are in the end indefeasibly national problems. Thus, they
provide an obvious parallel to current state efforts to exclude ex-offenders,
and sex offenders in particular, who are the target of even greater disdain
and social concern. Having been released from confinement, they become,
193. City of Phila., 437 U.S. at 622.
194. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 172 (1941) ("[lt is settled beyond question
that the transportation of persons is 'commerce,' within the meaning of [the Commerce
Clause.]").
195. City of Phila., 437 U.S. at 622.
196. Such articles include:
[Those] which, on account of their existing condition, would bring in and spread
disease, pestilence, and death, such as rags or other substances infected with the
germs of yellow fever or the virus of small-pox, or cattle or meat or other provisions
that are diseased or decayed, or otherwise, from their condition and quality, unfit
for human use or consumption.
Id. (quoting Bowman v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465 (1888)).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 627.
200. City of Phila., 437 U.S. at 628.
201. Id.
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in the words of the City of Philadelphia Court, a "problem shared by all, " ""
and in the words of the Edwards Court, "the common responsibility and
,,03
concern of the whole nation.
State residence exclusion laws, designed to
expel indigenous ex-offenders and repel others possibly seeking entry,
betray this understanding. They also present the same political-process
concerns20vis-A-vis
residents and nonresidents singled out by the Court in
4
Edwards.

While a very narrow slice of the imprisoned population faces indefinite
incarceration, nearly all inmates (including thousands of convicted sex
offenders)20' eventually reenter society, 6 facing what criminologist Joan
Petersilia has termed "coming home."20 7 Residence exclusion laws beg the
question of what "home" means. Edwards and City of Philadelphiaunderscore
that home is synonymous with the constituent parts of the nation, consistent
with what Justices Douglas and Jackson referred to" in
their Edwards
8
20
citizenship.
"national
of
right
the
as
concurring opinions
Importantly, this right is not one of a personal nature, such as the right
to travel or to be free of discrimination. Courts are unlikely to conclude that
residency laws jeopardize these rights as a technical matter, as the Eighth
Circuit's decision in Doe v. Miller makes clear.209 Rather, the right is a sociopolitical one deriving from the structure of the nation's constitutional

202. Id. at 629.
203. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 175 (1941).
204. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. Indeed, individuals targeted by exclusion
laws very likely experience political disempowerment that is far more acute and intractable than
that experienced by indigents (as in Edwards), given the unparalleled disdain they inspire. See
Logan, supra note 37, at 310-11 (discussing the "unique political impotence" of sex offenders,
even as compared to ex-offenders more generally).
205. See HARRISON & BECK, supra note 17, at 9 (noting that 142,000 state prison inmates in
2002 were convicted of sex offenses). Currently California alone has over 102,000 registered sex
offenders. BILL LOCKYER, CAL. ATr'Y GEN., 2004 REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE ON
CALIFORNIA SEX OFFENDER INFORMATION 5 (2005), available at http://www.meganslaw.ca.gov/

pdf/2004legreportcomplete.pdf.
206. TIMOTHY HUGHES & DORIS JAMES WILSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, REENTRY
TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/reentry/reentry.htm (last visited
Aug. 31, 2006) (noting that "[a]t least 95% of all State prisoners will be released from prison at
some point").
207. PETERSILIA, supra note 11, at 21.
208. Edwards, 314 U.S. at 178 (Douglas,J., concurring); id. at 183 (JacksonJ, concurring).
For elaboration of this theme, with particular attention paid to how the Fourteenth
Amendment's Citizenship Clause and Privileges or Immunities Clause should serve as bases to
invigorate nationalist inclusion, see F.H. Buckley, Liberal Nationalism, 48 UCLA L. REV. 221
(2000) (Privileges or Immunities Clause); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Belonging, Protectionand Equality:
The Neglected Citizenship Clause and the Limits of Federalism, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 281 (2000)
(Citizenship Clause).
209.
See supranotes 83-113 and accompanying text.
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framework and its collectivist traditions. 21 It is an example of what James
Weinstein recently referred to as the "set of federal structural common law
rules... designed to vindicate interstate relations,
taking its place among
other critically
important
non-textually
derived
rules limiting state
2
authority.

Much as limits on state efforts at economic isolationism evolved from
the recognized needs of a national economy, 213 the time has arrived for a
similar commitment to the imperative of national social union with regard
to ex-offenders. During the nation's early years, circumstances belied the
need for any such imperative inasmuch as criminal justice was administered
by insular governments, what Lawrence Friedman has called "tight little
islands,2 4 whose crime ,,214215
control efforts were of little national consequence.
However, as the nation has grown, and state criminal justice systems have
swept up ever greater numbers of individuals, post-confinement disposition
of criminal offenders, much like care of the poor and disposal of waste, has
become a problem of national concern.
As the discussion here makes clear, without this commitment, states will
succumb to the potent impulse to exclude ex-offenders in disregard of the
unavoidable national necessity to accommodate them. Because state
governments cannot forever imprison all offenders who occasion fear, a
fiscal 216 if not constitutional 217 impossibility, they cannot be permitted to

210. Structural reasoning traces its judicial origins back to McCulloch and Marbury, as
recognized in the seminal work of Professor Charles Black. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR.,
STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969). Since then, structuralism has
been a staple in conservative and liberal commentary and judicial opinions alike. See generally,
e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE (1995); Casey L.
Westover, Structural Interpretationand the New Federalism:Finding the Proper Balance Between State
Sovereignty and Federal Supremacy, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 693 (2005).
211. James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins ofJudicialJurisdiction:Implicationsfor
Modern Doctrine,90 VA. L. REv. 169, 289-90 (2004).
212. See id. at 290-91 & n.439 (noting, inter alia, "the dormant Commerce Clause rules, the
interstate migration rules, the interstate dispute rules, [and] the federal rules of jurisdiction
governing interstate recognition"); see also id. at 288 n.436 (noting, inter alia, "rules vindicating
the dormant Commerce Clause, interstate travel, and state sovereign immunity").
213. See City of Phila. v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978) ("[T]he bounds of [Dormant
Commerce Clause] restraints appear nowhere in the words of the Commerce Clause, but have
emerged gradually in the decisions of this Court giving effect to its basic purpose.").
214. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT INAMERICAN HISTORY 17 (1993).
215. SeeLogan, supra note 37, at 264.
216. See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, States Ease Laws on Time in Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2001, at
IA (noting that fiscal pressures have prompted several states to ratchet down lengthy criminal
sentences).
217. Under current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, states enjoy virtual carte blanche to
impose very lengthy prison terms. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 21 (2003) (noting that
successful Eighth Amendment challenges to non-capital sentences are "exceedingly rare").

EX-OFFENDERRESIDENCE EXCLUSION LA

S

avoid the responsibility of offender reentry.218 Rather, precisely because
those who have violated the nation's criminal laws carry a threat of
recidivism, and because successful ex-offender reentry entails significant
fiscal and social costs, states must share in shouldering the burdens of
integrating ex-offenders into the ranks of law-abiding society.
C.

PROSPECTS FOR REMEDY

In light of the difficulties presented by exclusion laws, one would hope
that a remedy might be readily at hand. Several potential avenues do come
to mind, none of which, unfortunately, hold realistic promise to stem the
tide of state exclusionary efforts.
As a threshold matter, ideally, remedy would lie in the affirmative
behavior of state governments, which might take it upon themselves to
cooperate with one another and refrain from enacting laws after recognizing
the ultimately negative effects of expulsion. Indeed, precedent exists for
interstate cooperation with regard to offender reentry matters. Since 1937,
states have worked together to facilitate the interstate movement of
individuals released from prisons and jails subject to probation and parole
conditions. 2 ' 9 Today, forty-eight states and the District of Columbia are
signatories of the Interstate Compact on Adult Offender Supervision
("ICAOS"), 22 0 which proclaims as its purpose:
[T]hrough means of joint and cooperative action among the
compacting states: to provide for the promotion of public safety
and protect the rights of victims through the control and
regulation of the interstate movement of offenders in the
community; to provide for the effective tracking, supervision, and
rehabilitation of these offenders by the sending and receiving
states; and to equitably distribute the costs, benefits, and
obligations of the compact among the compacting states. 221
The Compact empowers an interstate commission to promulgate rules
regulating the terms and conditions under which offenders can be
transferred between states, collect and manage data, assist in the resolution

218. In 2004 alone, nearly 700,000 individuals were released into communities from state
prisons, an eleven percent increase since 2000. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, PUBL'N NO. 213133, PRISON ANDJAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2005, at 6 (2006), available at

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pjim05.pdf.
219.

See INTERSTATE COMM'N FOR ADULT OFFENDER SUPERVISION, BENCH BOOK FOR JUDGES

AND COURT PERSONNEL
23-35
(2006)
[hereinafter
http://www.interstatecompact.org/legal/benchbook.pdf.

BENCH

BOOK],

available

at

220.
See Michael L. Buenger & Richard L. Masters, The Interstate Compact on Adult Offender
Supervision: Using Old Tools to Solve New Problems, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 71, 73 (2003). For
the text of the Model Act for the ICAOS, see BENCH BOOK, supra note 219, at 107-22.
221.

See BENCH BOOK, supra note 219, at 107.
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of disputes, and initiate enforcement
actions against any state in violation of
2
the Compact and its rules. 2
Like other state-state compacts, ranging from the placement of
children221 to the handling of insurance receiverships, 24 the ICAOS is
designed to address interstate challenges that, absent coordination, will
ultimately redound to the reciprocal disadvantage of individual states. In this
respect, the states' near-total endorsement of the ICAOS gives reason to be
optimistic about the prospect for like-minded cooperation among states in
the face of the ultimately deleterious effects of exclusion.
Cause for optimism fades, however, in the face of the practical reality of
the distinct nature of the challenge states encounter when it comes to exoffenders who are "on paper" (i.e., subject to post-release probation or
parole-supervision conditions) versus those who are not. Probationers and
parolees, who today number in the millions, 225 present an immediate,
practical challenge to states because their conditional release requires
ongoing supervision by some governmental authority. 226 When supervised
ex-offenders wish to migrate across state lines, a bureaucratic challenge of
significant magnitude is thus created. 227
Individuals who are "off paper," the subpopulation principally subject
to residence exclusion laws, 2211 pose no such logistical difficulties. Having
satisfied the terms of their conditional release into the community, they are

222. Buenger & Masters, supra note 220, at 119. Significantly, with the upsurge in parolees
and probationers attending the tough-on-crime initiatives beginning in the 1980s, states largely
ignored requirements contained in the 1937 Compact, prompting several legislatures to limit
entry of ex-offenders from other states. See id. at 112-13. In response, in the late 1990s the
Council of State Governments and other organizations spearheaded successful efforts to
revamp the Compact, resulting in the more rigorous standards and rules embodied in the
ICAOS today. See id. at 116.
223. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7900 (West 2004).
224. See, e.g., 45 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 160/5 (LexisNexis Supp. 2005). For a compilation
of state compacts, see http://www.csg.org/CSG/Programs/National+Center+for+Interstate+
Compacts/statutes.htm (follow "State Trends & Policy: Programs: National Care for Interstate
Compacts" hyperlink; Interstate Compact Database" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 20, 2006).
225. See LAUREN E. GLAZE & SERI PALLA, U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROBATION
AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2004, at 1 (noting that in 2004 the total number of persons
under community supervision in the United States was just under five million).
226. See 1 NEIL P. COHEN, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE § 17:34 (2d ed. 1999 &
Supp. 2006) (noting "severe practical problems" entailed in interstate monitoring of
probationers and parolees).
227. Over 3,200 distinct local authorities operating under 861 distinct agencies oversee the
interstate travel of parolees and probationers. See NAT'L INST. OF CORR., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE,
CONTEXT

FOR

AMENDING

THE

PAROLE

AND

PROBATION

INTERSTATE

http://nicic.org/Downloads/Other/background.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2006).
228.
See supra note 26.
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free to migrate elsewhere. 229 As a consequence, states have no pressing
practical incentive to work with one another, and indeed, as the residence
exclusion laws themselves attest, actually have230a short-term positive incentive
to act in disregard of one another's interests.
In the absence of a state-initiated remedy, the judiciary naturally comes
to mind as an option. As Alexander Bickel once observed, the unique
23
institutional position of the judiciary "lengthen[s] everyone's view." 1
"[The] courts," Bickel posited, "have certain capacities for dealing with
2 32
matters of principle that legislatures and executives do not possess."
Indeed, this sensitivity was evinced early on by the Supreme Court, when
Chief Justice Marshall observed that "[wihatever respect might have been
felt for the state sovereignties, it is not to be disguised that the framers of the
constitution viewed, with some apprehension,
the violent acts which might
233
grow out of the feelings of the moment."
Such "feelings of the moment" are now besetting the states and, thus
far, have met no resistance from state and federal courts. As discussed
earlier, residence exclusion laws have withstood a broad array of
constitutional challenges, 234 an outcome consistent with the historic
235
deference paid to the police power
of state legislatures,
whatever their
2 6
negative interstate spillover effects.

1

229. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 101 (2003) (distinguishing ex-offenders under postrelease supervision from those who are not and noting that the latter "are free to move where
they wish and to live and work as other citizens, with no supervision").
230.
Cf Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 27 (2003) (noting a "positive consequence" of
California's "three strikes" law was that it encouraged parolees to leave the state). As I have
noted elsewhere, "[w]ith criminal justice, there is, in effect, no 'Delaware'-no individual state
calls the shots with respect to crime control policies, creating a climate in which competition
(to the extent it exists) is perhaps keener than in the corporate law realm, where Delaware's
preeminence has been theorized to undercut competition." Logan, supra note 134, at 1747
n.99.
231.
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 26 (lst ed. 1962).

232. Id. at 25.
233. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (Cranch) 87, 137-38 (1810) (Marshall, C.J.); see also id. at 138
("[T]he people of the United States, in adopting [the Constitution], have manifested a
determination to shield themselves.., from the effects of those sudden and strong passions to
which men are exposed."); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 83
(1921) (recognizing that "[s]tatutes are designed to meet the fugitive exigencies of the hour").
234. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
235. As the Court noted in L'Hote v. City of New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587 (1900), "[i]t has often
been said that the police power was not by the Federal Constitution transferred to the nation,
but was reserved to the States, and that upon them rests the duty of so exercising it as to protect
the public health and morals." Id. at 596; see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618
n.8 (2000) (emphasizing that a "generalized police power" reserved to the states "is deeply
ingrained in our constitutional history"). On the question of state police power authority more
generally, Professor Barnett has observed:
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Other potential constitutional claims, such as those sounding in the
Privileges and Immunities and the Dormant Commerce Clauses, likewise
hold little promise for ultimate success. This is because, despite the severe
disabling effects of residence exclusion laws, courts will be inclined to find
that-as did the Eighth Circuit in Doe v. Miller2 3 7-the

laws technically permit

targeted individuals to remain in states and allow for ingress of others. As a
result, no express denial of rights, such as troubled the Court in Saenz, 238 will
be thought constitutionally implicated. Likewise, unlike in Saenz,239 the laws
do not facially discriminate-in-state and out-of-state individuals alike are
potentially subject to exclusion-also undercutting privileges and
immunities concerns. 240
With respect to the DCC in particular, even if excluded individuals
qualify as "commerce" a la Edwards, no successful challenge would likely lie
because the facially neutral character of exclusion laws would relegate their
analysis to a less demanding standard of constitutional review. If deemed
nondiscriminatory, the laws would be analyzed pursuant to the balancing
test enunciated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,2 4 1 which provides that when a law
"regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest and
its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation
to the putative local benefits." 212 There is strong reason to believe that,
despite the highly questionable efficacy of residence exclusion laws, 243 courts
applying Pike will defer to the judgment of state legislatures on their public

Determining the propriety of state laws is more problematic than with federal
powers ... because there is no list of enumerated powers the original meaning of
which can be used to distinguish proper from improper exercises of power.
Indeed, there is nothing in the Constitution that speaks to the issue of the proper

scope of state powers.
Randy E. Barnett, The ProperScope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.429, 434 (2004).
236.
See, e.g.,
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 27 (2003) (noting with seeming approval that
the "'unintended but positive consequence'" of California's draconian three-strikes law was to
encourage parolees to leave the state (quoting OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, CAL. DEP'T
OFJUSTICE, THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT-ITS IMPACT ON THE CALIFORNIA CRIMINALJUSTICE

SYSTEM AFTER FOURYEARS 10 (1998))).
237. See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
239. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999).
240.
See Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path": A
Theory of JudicialEnforcement of Federalism, 68 S.CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1448 (1995) ("The Privileges
and Immunities Clause has been construed to protect only against state rules... distinguishing
between citizens and noncitizens of states.").
241.
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
242. Id. at 142.
243. See supranote 130-33 and accompanying text.
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policy wisdom, as did the Eighth Circuit in Doe v. Miller,244 dooming any DCC
claim.
In addition, the distinct prospect exists that reviewing courts will
subscribe to lingering precedent condoning state isolationist tendencies visa-vis socially disdained subpopulations. Indeed, while Edwards condemned
Miln's approval of state efforts to bar "paupers," bristling at the archaic
stereotype motivating Miln (decided in 1836) that equated "[p]overty and
immorality," 245 it avoided reconsideration of Miln's tacit approval of state
authority to bar "convicts." 246 State laws targeting ex-offenders, sex offenders
in particular, would not likely be so readily dismissed as outmoded and
irrational, but rather considered justified in light of such individuals'
established propensity to violate the criminal law.247 Similarly, temptation
will exist to equate ex-offenders with the exception carved out in City of
and spread
Philadelphia,condoning state prohibitions of items that "'bring in
' 248
waste.
"'valueless
otherwise
and
death"'
and
pestilence,
disease,
A third and final possible institutional avenue for relief is Congress,
which has previously intervened in instances of state externalization of social
problems. Most often Congress has done so when states have engaged in a
"race to the bottom," as is said to occur with environmental policy when
249
states weaken their regulations in an effort to attract or retain business. In
such instances, federal intervention is thought warranted to forestall the
possibility that states may adopt weaker (and thus more environmentally
harmful) regulations than they perhaps naturally would in the absence of

244. See supranote 100-02, 113 and accompanying text.
245. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941) (."Whatever may have been the notion
then prevailing, we do not think that it will now be seriously contended that because a person is
without employment and without funds he constitutes a 'moral pestilence.' Poverty and
immorality are not synonymous.").
246. See id. at 176 (citing Mo., Kan. & Topeka Ry. v. Haber, 169 U.S. 613 (1898); Plumley v.
Massachusetts, 155 U.S. 461 (1894); R.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465 (1877); Smith v. Turner
(The Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849)); see also Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S.
275, 280 (1875) (stating similarly in dictum); cf Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 19 (1800)
("The right to confiscate and banish, in the case of an offending citizen, must belong to every
government.").
247. This predisposition would be enhanced by courts' persistent assertion that sex
offenders recidivate at a far greater rate than other offender subpopulations, an assertion
contradicted by empirical work. See LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CHILD
available at
1 (1996),
THEIR VICTIMS
AND
OFFENDERS
VIOLENT
VICTIMIZERS:
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cvvoatvx.pdf; PATRICK A. LANGAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, PUBL'N No. NCJ-198281, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994,
at 24 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf.
248. City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622 (1978) (quoting Bowman v. Chi. & Nw.
Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 489 (1888)).
249. See generally Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting:Is There a "Race" and
Is It "to the Bottom'?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997).
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interstate competition, thereby negatively impacting other states. 250 Federal
laws regulating firearms, which can be readily transferred across state lines,
represent another example of federal intervention in the face of lax state
policies. 25 With exclusion laws, on the other hand, the concern is not
laxness; rather, concern stems from emulation of harsh laws out of a mutual
governmental desire to purge ex-offenders, to the immediate detriment of
other states, and ultimately the nation as a whole.
While other potential jurisdictional bases might support federal
action, 252 the most promising basis likely lies in Congress's invocation of its
Spending Clause authority.25' A prime illustration of the exercise of this
authority came in the 1980s when Congress, alarmed over a looming crisis
inspired by states' aversion to locating low-level radioactive waste within their
territories, required states to provide for the disposal of such waste, either
internally or in other states pursuant to multi-state compacts. 254 Congress did
so by means of a series of monetary "incentives" that the Supreme Court
unanimously upheld in New York v. United States.255
Just as states needed an incentive to accommodate radioactive waste,
they now need an incentive not to expel and repel ex-offenders by means of
residence exclusion laws. Congress could, consistent with Spending Clause

250. Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REv. 570, 627-38
(1996).
251. See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1276,
1310-12 (2005); see also Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, The Underfederalizationof Crime, 6 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 247, 285 (1997) (advocating federal gun control involvement due to mobility
of individuals and guns and because "one state's stringent gun control measure can be
substantially undermined if bordering states choose not to enact such a measure").
252. For instance, as recognized in Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 329 n.17 (1981),
Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to adopt a national regulatory scheme to
address intrastate activities, including those within the traditional regulatory ambit of state
police power, that are not themselves of a commercial or an economic nature. State-imposed
limits on the capacity of individuals to move to or remain in states would arguably qualify. Cf
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 32-33 (2005) (upholding congressional authority to criminalize
possession, manufacture, or use of marijuana in face of state law providing medical purpose
exception).
253. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (empowering Congress to tax and "provide for the
common Defense and General Welfare"); see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206
(1987) (observing that pursuant to its spending power "Congress may attach conditions on the
receipt of federal funds").
254. See Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendment Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-240, §
5(3) (2), 99 Stat. 1842 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2021e (2000)).
255. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 171-72 (1992). A majority of the Court did,
however, find fault with one aspect of the Act, the "take title" provision, which offered states the
option of either enacting laws in compliance with federal laws on the storage and disposal of
radioactive waste, or in the alternative, assuming ownership over all radioactive waste in the
state. A 6-3 majority deemed the provision an impermissible act of federal commandeering of
state authority, in violation of the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 177.

EX-OFFENDER RESIDENCEEXCLUSION LAWS
requirements, 256 conditionally prohibit states from enacting such
authority
257
laws.

However, even if Congress enjoys the authority to intervene, concern
remains over whether a congressional solution is realistic. Historic instances
such as the Indian Removal Act of 1830258 and the Chinese Exclusion Act of
219
call into question Congress's willingness to legislate in favor of
1882,
inclusiveness in times of national anxiety over particular subpopulations.
More recently, this aversion has manifested itself with respect to criminal
justice policy, especially, with Congress exercising its Spending Clause
authority to compel harsher (never more lenient) strategies, 26 including
261
laws targeting sex offenders in particular.
Moreover, serious doubt exists over the willingness of Congress to act in
this particular context, given that it requires federal political leaders to step
in and limit the centrifugal will of state legislatures. Even though members

256.

See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 232-33 (7th ed.

2004) (discussing four-part test used to determine propriety of Congress's invocation of its
Spending Clause authority).
257. Any such legislation would of course need to be sensitive to the recognized power of
individual states to adopt criminal justice policies that, ultimately, can also function to expel
and repel ex-offenders. A prime illustration of this capacity is found in California's notably
harsh "three strikes" law, which imposes heightened prison terms on recidivists and was
condoned by the Supreme Court in Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 21 (2003). Such laws, for
better or worse, are a byproduct of the nation's federalist system-manifestations of the
extolled ideal of states as "laboratories" of social and economic experimentation. See New State
Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,dissenting). Where the tipping
point lies relative to extraterritorial effect, sufficient to warrant concern, is a critically important
question with major ramifications for federalism, but one that is beyond the scope of this Essay.
Suffice it to say, the state laws examined here, which impose express residence restrictions on a
class of individuals, justify collectivist concern warranting federal attention.
258. The Indian Removal Act of 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411.
259. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Star. 58.
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. §
260. See, e.g.,
13702(a) (2000) (providing grants to states that require violent offenders to serve at least 85%
of their prison terms); Aimee's Law, 42 U.S.C. § 13713 (2000) (exempting states from
reimbursement requirements for the prosecution of their parolees who recidivate in other
states if they adopt specified minimum sentences for specified serious offenders). For more on
the unique political factors driving Congress to enact particularly draconian laws, see generally
Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1276 (2005); Sara
Sun Beale, What's Law Got to Do with It? The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal
FactorsInfluencing the Development of (Federal)Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23 (1997).
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, §
See, e.g.,
261.
125, 120 Stat. 587, 597 (2006) (conditioning states' receipt of federal law enforcement funds on
adoption of specified minimum registration and community notification requirements for
convicted sex offenders); cf Eileen A. Scallen, Analyzing "The Politics of [Evidence] Rulemaking,"
53 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 855-56 (2002) (discussing decision by Congress to amend the Federal
Rules of Evidence to make it easier to admit evidence of prior sexual misconduct to establish,
inter alia, propensity and character, despite vigorous opposition of U.S. Judicial Conference
and many critics).
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of Congress theoretically seek to serve the best interests of the nation,262
because they must stand for election before state voters, the political
popularity of exclusion laws diminishes to the point of near extinction the
likelihood of congressional intervention. Federal elected officials will be
loath to act in a way that can be portrayed as being at once "pro-sex
offender" 6' and contrary to the revered police authority of states. 26
In sum, despite the detriments of residence exclusion laws, their
proliferation appears likely to continue unabated. State legislatures lack any
practical incentive to cooperatively resist the temptation of exclusion and
naturally embrace it as a politically popular method of social control that at
once assuages public anxiety over crime and avoids the major costs of
continued incarceration. Nor, for reasons discussed, do the courts and
Congress hold promise as means to intercede in what will in all likelihood be
an ongoing race to enact exclusion laws.
V.

CONCLUSION

65
Historically, disdain for criminal offenders has been viewed as natural
and even socially beneficial. Emile Durkheim, for one, extolled the societal
benefit of punishing criminals, maintaining that targeting wrongdoers for
sanction reaffirms the collective moral order and promotes social

262. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 803 (1995) ("[Iln [the] National
Government, representatives owe primary allegiance not to the people of a State, but to the
people of the Nation ....
Representatives and Senators are as much officers of the entire
Union as is the President."); see also Wayne A. Logan, Creating a "Hydra in Government": Federal
Recourse to State Law in Crime Fighting,86 B.U. L. REv. 65, 89 (2006) (noting same and providing
additional historical evidence in support of view).
263.

See generally LORD WINDLESHAM, POLITICS, PUNISHMENT, AND POPULISM 100-04, 177-88

(1998) (discussing catalytic political pressures prompting rapid and near-unanimous adoption
of recent federal sex offender-related laws). In the state context, the Iowa Legislature has
resisted efforts to amend its law, rejecting concerns about exclusion voiced by the Iowa County
Attorneys Association and the state sheriffs association. Tom Shaw, Prosecutor: Offender Law
Flawed, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Jan. 28, 2006, at IA; see also Jill Young Miller, Keeping Sex
Offenders Away from . . . Schoos/Playgrounds/Bus Stops/Churches-Is It as Practicalas It Sounds?,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 17, 2006, at Al (noting lobbying effort of the Georgia Sheriffs
Association seeking to modify exclusion zone provision relating to school bus stops due to
enforcement difficulties and quoting one sheriff as saying "[w]e're kind of against the wall on
this one because if you don't support it (the bill) you're seen as soft on crime").
264. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) (stressing the predominant,
autonomous role of states on criminal justice matters); THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 137 (James
Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., Johns Hopkins Paperbacks 1981) (2d ed. 1966) ("The powers
reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of
affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people. .. ").
265. See, e.g., 2JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 81
(1883) ("The criminal law . . . proceeds upon the principle that it is morally right to hate
criminals, and it confirms and justifies that sentiment by inflicting upon criminals punishments
which express it.").
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cohesion.2 6 History itself provides ample evidence of the impulse to target
"dangerous classes,"267 to physically exclude unwanted individuals,2ss and the

more general desire to reify and define the moral "us" versus the immoral
"them. 269
These tendencies, however, assume new significance in modern
America, which for the past two decades has engaged in a historically
unprecedented experiment in mass penality,2 resulting in millions of
Americans being branded with the highly stigmatizing ex-offender label,
with its many social and legal impediments. 271 In this context, the espoused
Durkheimian benefits associated with stigmatization and ostracism collide
with a pragmatic reality: the necessity of eventually reintegrating these freed
millions back into society. The assimilation of convicted sex offenders has
proven especially controversial and difficult, prompting an array of social
control strategies, including laws that prohibit such individuals from living

in specified areas.
Residence exclusion laws remain untested in terms of their efficacy,
and, indeed, the available evidence suggests that they actually may be

266.
EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 102 (George Simpson trans.,
Macmillan Co. 1933) (1893) ("Crime brings together upright consciences and concentrates
them."); see also DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY 33 (1990) (attributing to
Durkheim the view that punishment provides "an occasion for the collective expression of
shared moral passions, and this collective expression serves to strengthen these same passions
through mutual reinforcement and reassurance").
267. See CHARLES LORING BRACE, THE DANGEROUS CLASSES OF NEW YORK, AND TWENTY
YEARS' WORK AMONG THEM 28-29 (1872) (characterizing such persons as a congregate of the
"great masses of the destitute, miserable, and criminal persons"); cf FRIEDMAN, supra note 53, at
83-106 (discussing historic use of the criminal law to target particular "outsider" groups and
maintain social status quo); Eric S. Janus, The Preventive State, Terrorists and Sexual Predators:
Countering the Threat of a New OutsiderJurisprudence, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 576, 582-87 (2004)
(discussing "the concept of the degraded 'other,'" citing historic instances of such "outsider
groups" in American constitutional history).
268.
See, e.g., Martine Kaluszynski, Republican Identity: Bertillonageas Government Technique, in
DOCUMENTING INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATE PRACTICES IN THE MODERN
WORLD 123, 136-37 (Jane Caplan & John Torpey eds., 2001) (discussing efforts by French
authorities in the early 1900s to exclude gypsies from communes).
269.
See Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371, 427 (2001)
(characterizing "displacement [as] the central act of community").
270.
For an expansive treatment of the broader social and political forces driving this
transformation, see generally DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL
ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001).
271.
See generally JUSTICE POLICY CENTER, URBAN INSTITUTE, UNDERSTANDING THE
CHALLENGES OF PRISONER REENTRY: RESEARCH FINDINGS FROM THE URBAN INSTITUTE'S PRISONER
REENTRY PORTFOLIO
(2006),
http://www.urban.org.cfm?ID=411289
(discussing myriad
challenges faced by ex-offenders, including housing and employment scarcity); Michael Pinard,
An IntegratedPerspective on the CollateralConsequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced
by Formerly IncarceratedIndividuals,86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 634-38 (2006) (discussing extensive array
of collateral consequences imposed as a result of criminal convictions).
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harmful because they increase the prospects for reoffense.2 72 This Essay,
however, has focused on the negative impact of the laws on the nation's
unity-enforcing constitutional structure, doctrine, and traditions. While
economic isolationism was of predominant concern during the framing era,
exclusion laws make clear the contemporary need for a kindred effort to
combat the social tensions and negative reciprocities
bred in an era when
273
states have come to "govern through crime."
Whatever the preference of individual states, and despite the
increasingly isolationist tenor of American society more generally,2 74 exoffender reentry is unavoidably a "problem shared by all." As recognized
since the nation's formation, no state can be permitted to except itself from
common national challenges. Rather than presenting an internal police
power matter, in which "the general welfare of the United States is not
concerned, "27 the treatment of ex-offenders is manifestly a national concern
that ultimately must be addressed by the constituent parts of the nation as a
whole. In the end, this imperative stems not from any idealized expression
of nationalistic fealty, but rather from an irreducibly pragmatic need-based
reality. For, as Justice Cardozo's oft-repeated recognition reminds us, the
nation's constitutional order was based on a "political philosophy less
parochial in range .... [T] hat the peoples of the several states must sink or

swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in
union and not division."276

272.

See supranotes 130-31 and accompanying text.

273.

See JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: THE WAR ON CRIME AND THE

OF AMERICA, 1960-2000, at 5 (forthcoming 2006) ("[W]hatever effects
American governments have had on crime through the war on crime, crime has changed how
we govern ourselves, our institutions, our polities.").
274. As Richard Schragger has observed, "We live in a society that relies heavily on
boundaries .... Instead of an inclusionary concept, community has become a mechanism for
building high normative and literal walls in legal, social, and physical space." Richard C.
Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371, 471 (2001).
275.
Barnett, supra note 235, at 476 (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, at 21 (Max Farrand ed., 3d ed. 1966) (statement of Mr. Sherman,July 17, 1787)).
276.
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
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